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As the reach of collective bargaining has shrunk in recent decades, the domain of 
employment law – of judicially-enforceable individual rights and administratively-
enforced regulatory standards – has expanded.  Both branches of employment law have 
seen the rise of employer “self-regulation” – internal systems for enforcement of rights 
and regulatory standards – and of legal inducements to self-regulation in the form of 
reduced public oversight or sanctions.  In the shift from “self-governance” to “self-
regulation,” employees have lost their institutional voices and are losing the protective 
oversight of courts and public agencies.  In this article Professor Estlund looks for ways 
not to combat the movement toward self-regulation – which she finds both inexorable and 
potentially promising – but to channel that movement so as both to fortify employee 
rights and labor standards, and to give employees a stronger voice in their own work 
lives and workplaces.  Drawing on a range of regulatory theory and experience, Estlund 
casts outside monitors – independent of employers, accountable to employees and the 
public – in a central role in a system of “monitored self- regulation.”  Employees play 
essential supporting roles as whistleblowers, informants, and watchdogs; and targeted 
public enforcement and private litigation supply much of the impetus for effective self-
regulation.  The article aims to bridge the divide between labor law and employment law 
– to find leverage within the dynamic law of workplace rights and regulations for the 
rejuvenation of employee voice, and to use new forms of employee voice to help realize 
workplace rights and improve labor standards.
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Reconstituting the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation
I. Introduction
Wal-Mart, Inc., stymied by labor and community opposition to its expansion plans1
and battered by legal challenges under state and federal wage and hours laws,2
immigration laws, labor laws, and most recently by the certification of an unprecedented 
1.6 million member class of sex discrimination plaintiffs, recently announced the creation 
of a “Corporate Compliance Team.”3  The world’s largest private employer and reigning 
nemesis of organized labor and other employee advocates has vowed to use its legendary 
organizational capabilities, along with new technology and compensation policies, to 
become “a corporate leader in employment practices.”  According to the company, new 
software will insure that workers are taking required breaks and not working “off the 
clock”; a new job classification and pay structure will insure pay equity; managers’ 
compensation will reflect in part their achievement of “diversity goals.” 
What are we to make of Wal-Mart, Inc., vowing to reorganize itself into a model 
corporate citizen in its labor practices?  Do these measures represent a cynical and 
superficial public relations gesture?  A genuine and public-spirited embrace of corporate 
responsibility?  Or perhaps simply a rational set of precautions against future “accidents” 
and attendant liability?  Are these measures diversionary tactics that should be exposed 
and discounted, or do they show the law working just as it should by inducing 
compliance?  Or do they represent something new and important in the evolution of the 
law of the workplace?  
What is new lies not so much in Wal-Mart’s organizational response to the external 
legal environment – the corporate compliance bandwagon has been on the road for some 
time – but in the the response of external law to internal compliance programs like Wal-
Mart’s.  Such programs are no longer simple litigation avoidance schemes instituted 
1
 See Stephen Kinzer, Wal-Mart's Big-City Plans Stall Again, New York Times, May 6, 2004, at A-27
2
 See Steve Greenhouse, In-House Audit Says Wal-Mart Violated Labor Laws, New York Times, Jan. 
13, 2004, at A-16. 
3 Wal-Mart Details Progress Toward Becoming a Leader in Employment Practices, News release, June 
4, 2004 (available at http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/Mainnews.jsp).  
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under the “shadow of the law.”4  Rather, they seek to meet explicit demands of external 
law and to earn distinct legal benefits.  The coordination of internal or “self-regulatory” 
compliance structures with the external law of the workplace has the potential to create 
something genuinely new under the sun:  a new mechanism for the enforcement of 
employee rights and labor standards, one that engages employees and revives the 
prospects for employee voice in the wake of declining unionization.  But it also has the 
potential to divert crucial public resources from the task of securing compliance with 
public norms, and to enfeeble the few fearsome legal weapons that worker advocates 
have in their efforts to enforce basic employee rights and labor standards.  It all depends.
To understand on what it depends, and to shape the divergent possibilities that are 
presented by the movement toward “self-regulation” in the workplace, it will be helpful 
to look back from whence it came.  For “self-regulation” resonates with very old ideas in 
workplace governance.  The New Deal model of industrial relations itself, with its 
reliance on self-organization of workers and voluntary collective bargaining over most 
terms and conditions of employment, is itself a system of “self-regulation” or self-
governance.5  As the New Deal model of industrial self-governance in the United States 
has grown old and ossified, however, the problems to which collective bargaining was to 
be the answer have not disappeared.6  Nor has the law ceased to grapple with them.  On 
the contrary, the role of law – of courts, of legislation, and of regulatory bodies – has 
burgeoned as the ambit of unions and collective bargaining has contracted.  In short, the 
external law governing the workplace has grown as the New Deal system of internalized 
lawmaking and dispute resolution has shrunk.  
4
 The term is usually coupled with “bargaining” to describe the law’s influence beyond its institutional 
reach. See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).  But it works as well to capture how managers “manage under the 
shadow of law,” in light of how their actions might be assessed in case of litigation.
5
 The idea of the collective bargaining model as a system of self-governance has been elucidated by 
leading doctrinal scholars, see Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 
Mich. L. Rev. 1, -- (1958); by theorists, see Phillip Selznick, Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (196-); 
and by the Supreme Court, see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 580 (1960).
6
 By “ossified,” I mean entrenched against reform by a variety of mechanisms.  See Cynthia Estlund, 
The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1527 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, 
Ossification].
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Since the 1960s, the New Deal collective bargaining system has been supplemented, 
and largely supplanted, by other models of workplace governance:  a “regulatory model” 
of minimum standards enforceable by administrative agencies, exemplified by the wage 
and hour laws and OSHA; and a “rights model” of judicially enforceable individual 
rights, exemplified by the civil rights laws and the employee rights underlying the law of 
wrongful discharge.  These two bodies of law, which make up much of what we call 
“employment law,” each mobilized institutions and resources that were not central to the 
collective bargaining model constituted by “labor law.”  The regulatory model harnessed 
the coercive power and comprehensive reach of the government, while the rights model 
made courts central to the articulation and enforcement of employee rights, and tapped 
into the self-interest and indignation of aggrieved individuals and the professional and 
entrepreneurial energies of their attorneys.  
Much as they fought against the constraints of collective bargaining, employers have 
fought back against the burdens of regulatory compliance and of litigation.  But 
challenges to the efficacy of regulation and litigation of workplace rights and standards 
have come not only from employers but from scholars and employee advocates as well.  
Observers from a range of perspectives have argued that the postwar regime of 
“command-and-control” regulation is losing its grip in the face of rapidly changing 
markets, technology, and firm structures;7 that civil litigation is a costly, slow, and often 
inaccessible mechanism for securing workplace rights.8
These complaints and critiques have begun to make their mark on the external law of 
the workplace.  They have produced not deregulation in any simple sense but a trend 
toward “self-regulation” – toward the internalization or privatization of public law 
7 See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 131-55 (1982); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. 
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998).
8 Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws: 
A Comparative Analysis, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1401 (2004) Wayne N. Outten, Negotiations, ADR, and 
Severance/Settlement Agreements: An Employee's Lawyer's Perspective, 604 PLI/Lit 235, 249-50 (1999); 
Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment 
Arbitration Agreements,  16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 559 (2001).  A particularly influential critique came 
from the Clinton Adminstration’s blue ribbon panel on labor and employment policy, which found 
employment litigation to be unsatisfactory for employees and employers and called for expanded use of 
arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution.  See The Dunlop Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations, Final Report 59-60 (1995)
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enforcement.9  Agencies responsible for enforcing labor standards have experimented 
with cooperative programs designed to bring about “self-regulation” and “voluntary 
compliance.”   Courts responsible for enforcing employee rights have begun to formalize 
the role of internal compliance procedures and to defer to private dispute resolution 
schemes (including arbitration), according employers a partial shield against litigation 
and liability based on those schemes.  These developments bring the locus of 
enforcement of both rights and regulations inside the firm or under the firm’s control.  
The internal compliance regimes of Wal-Mart and many other employers must be seen in 
that light:  as efforts not simply to comply with the law but to secure the legal advantages 
of self-regulation and a partial shield against regulatory and judicial intervention. 
Detractors see in these moves toward self-regulation a disguised form of 
deregulation.  Proponents see the evolution of more efficient and effective systems for 
enforcing legal norms.10  Much turns on how self-regulation works – what standards of 
procedural fairness courts impose on arbitration agreements; what standards of efficacy 
and what institutional safeguards regulators require of “self-regulating” firms.  
Indeed, regulatory theory and experience suggests that the term “self-regulation” 
obscures much that is important to the success of the enterprise.  Leading scholarly 
accounts of effective self-regulation teach, first, that “self-regulation” must itself be 
regulated.11  It must be subject to some form of oversight and accountability to the public, 
and backed by the potential for serious sanctions.  But that oversight need not come –
indeed should not come – exclusively from the state.  There is much theory and 
experience behind the proposition that effective self-regulation in the workplace is 
“tripartite” in structure:  It requires the participation of the government, the regulated 
firm, and representatives of the workers for whose benefit the relevant legal norms 
9
 For an overview of some experiments in self-regulation across a range of fields, see Jody Freeman,
Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 813, 831-35 (2000).
10
 Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 101 
(1992); Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness 105-06 (1982).  For an argument in favor of self-regulation in regard to the problem of 
workplace harassment, see Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1227, 1293-
95 (1994).
11
 See Part III below (relying especially on Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note --).
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exist.12  Self-regulatory processes in which workers participate can introduce flexibility 
and responsiveness into the regulatory regime, and can reduce the costs and 
contentiousness associated with litigation, while promoting the internalization of public 
law norms into the workplace itself.  
Tripartism in the context of workplace regulation normally implies union or union-
like representation.  The problem, of course, is that the move toward self-regulation has 
coincided with a drastic decline in unionization, and thus in the only legally-sanctioned 
vehicle in the US for employee representation within the firm.13  Even apart from the 
trend toward self-regulation, both employee rights and workplace regulations are often 
underenforced in the absence of union representation, especially where employers are 
committed to competing through the minimization of labor costs.14  The movement 
toward self-regulation, and the attendant retreat of public agencies and of courts from the 
front lines of enforcement, exacerbates this vulnerability.  Yet the prospects for reviving 
and dramatically extending the New Deal collective bargaining model seem bleak.15
The story so far – like many labor law stories these days – threatens to become a 
lamentation:  The same relentless forces of capital and competition that have eroded 
unionization have led employers to push for the internalization and domestication of both 
12
 See Part IV infra. The concept of tripartism in labor relations and labor regulation is not new.  John 
Commons was a proponent nearly a century ago.  See John Commons, Labor and Administration 382-94 
(1913), cited in Bruce E. Kaufman, John R. Commons and the Wisconsin School of Industrial Relations 
Strategy and Policy, 57 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3, 10 (2003).
13
 One critic sees the rise of self-regulation as contributing to the decline of employee voice:  “By 
diverting attention to management monitoring systems, and away from classic voice mechanisms …, self-
regulatory initiatives run the risk of supplanting rather than buttressing democratic participation in the 
workplace.”  Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law 
Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 401 (2001).
14
 On the role of unions in enforcing employment rights and labor standards, see generally Robert J. 
Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. Rev. 169 (1991); Charles B. 
Craver, Why Labor Unions Must (and Can) Survive, 1 U. Penn. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 15 (1998).  Catherine 
Fisk extends this literature by contending for the role of union lawyers in helping to enforce labor statutes 
in non-union workplaces.  Catherine Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 Berkeley J. Emp. & 
Lab. L. 57 (2002).
15
 In part that is because the right to form a union is perhaps the most trampled and underenforced of 
employees’ legal rights.  See Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of 
Union Organizing Drives, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 351, 351-54 (1990); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: 
Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1771-1803 
(1983).  See also Richard W. Hurd & Joseph B. Uehlein, Patterned Responses to Organizing: Case Studies 
of the Union-Busting Convention, in Restoring the Promise of American Labor Law 61 ((Sheldon 
Friedman et al. eds., 1994).  
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rights and regulatory enforcement.  That process of internalization exacerbates the 
vulnerability of employees who lack a collective voice within firms, and threatens to 
collapse into deregulation.  That is the fatalistic version of the story.  
I aim instead to retell the story as one of opportunity.  I argue that the models of 
workplace governance that have emerged in the wake of the decline of the collective 
bargaining model can be both improved by and turned to the cause of promoting 
democratic self-governance within the workplace.  As this formulation suggests, I have in 
mind two interconnected objectives.  The first is to make rights more real and regulatory 
standards more effective, in part by giving employees an institutionalized role in the 
enforcement process.  The second is to find footholds within “employment law” for the 
realization of the core normative commitment of New Deal “labor law”: the commitment 
to workplace democracy and effective worker participation in self-governance.  For the 
commitment to democracy, which is utterly absent from the avalanche of litigation and 
legislation that makes up employment law, turns out to be one key to the efficacy of 
employment law, especially in an era of self-regulation.  
The movement of employment law and its enforcement inside firms creates not only 
the need but also the opportunity for reviving employees’ voice inside firms.  That is 
because the law can and does impose conditions on firms’ ability to secure the legal 
advantages of self-regulation – conditions that aim to ensure the efficacy of self-
regulation.  In keeping with the precepts of tripartism, one of those conditions should be 
the organized participation of the employees whose rights and working conditions are at 
stake.  The challenge is to reconfigure tripartism for the overwhelmingly non-union 
environment that exists, and is likely to persist, in the US.  Drawing from recent efforts to 
gain regulatory traction over third-world sweatshops and over American corporate 
executives, as well as from existing American experiments with self-regulation in the 
workplace, I cobble together a constellation of actors and mechanisms that together can 
make up, or make up for, the third leg of the tripartite scheme.  
At the center of that constellation are independent monitors or auditors, who oversee 
the self-regulatory system and safeguard its integrity.  Provided they are independent 
from employers and accountable in some manner to workers and the public, monitors can 
SELF-REGULATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE PAGE 9
both leverage limited public enforcement resources and serve some of the watchdog 
functions that employees in the non-union setting cannot.  Moreover, independent 
monitoring of workplaces can help give voice to individual workers by serving both as a 
conduit for what they know and as protection against employer reprisals.  The periodic 
presence of independent monitors inside the workplace represents a small but visible 
breach of employer sovereignty over the workplace, and may help dispel the fear that 
inhibits both employees’ participation in law enforcement and their impulses toward self-
organization.  Alongside independent monitors and individual employee 
“whistleblowers,” employees and their private attorneys also play important roles, both in 
bolstering the efforts of public agencies and in insuring against their capture.  The 
existence of private rights of action is thus a key component of the hybrid model that I 
call “monitored self-regulation.” 
The aim of this article is to chart a strategy for reforming the law of the workplace 
that straddles the conventional divide between “labor law” and “employment law.”  The 
key to that strategy is a recognition that democracy within the workplace is not only of 
intrinsic value in a democratic society – that proposition has been much mooted and will 
not be further elaborated here – but of instrumental value in realizing the rights and the 
regulatory norms governing the workplace.  That is especially true in an era of self-
regulation, in which the locus of enforcement is moving inside the workplace and away 
from direct public oversight.  As firms gain increasing responsibility for the enforcement 
of public norms that are supposed to protect workers, it is ever more important to find 
ways to make workers’ voices heard both in internal enforcement processes and in the 
public oversight of those processes.  
I begin by briefly charting, in Part II, the rise of employment law – both the rights 
model and the regulatory model – and, in Part III, the rise within both models of legally 
sanctioned forms of “self-regulation.”  Part IV turns to some theoretical frameworks for 
effective self-regulation.  I find a thoroughly convincing theoretical case for full-fledged 
tripartism, as well as some entrenched obstacles to tripartism within US context.  In the 
face of those obstacles, I develop a hybrid model of “monitored self-regulation” within 
which independent third-party monitors help to hold up the third leg of tripartism in an 
overwhelmingly non-union environment.  Part V examines some existing experiments in 
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the self-regulation of labor standards, and offers proposals for reform based the precepts 
of “monitored self-regulation.”  Part VI does the same within the rights arena.  
II. The Rise of Employment Law:  Rights and Regulations without Representation
Among the centerpieces of the New Deal, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
(NLRA) established a “constitution” of the private sector workplace – a framework for 
self-governance supported by a set of individual and group rights and an administrative 
enforcement scheme.16  That framework sought to permit workers, acting through unions, 
and management to enact “legislation” in the form of a collective bargaining agreement 
and to set up a system of adjudication and interpretation through grievance arbitration.  
The New Deal labor scheme was supposed to take most labor disputes and struggles for 
improved working conditions out of the courts and legislatures and into a reconstructed 
domain of contractually-based self-governance, in which workers were citizens, with 
rights of association and freedom of expression, and the workplace was a site of self-
determination.17
By comparison to the federal Constitution, the New Deal constitution of the 
workplace was missing some important provisions.  It did not “guaranty …  a republican 
form of government,” leaving to majority rule and the precarious process of union 
organizing the question of whether workers were to be represented at all.  It lacked an 
“equal protection clause” banning discrimination on the basis of race or other ascriptive 
traits.  Missing, too, was a requirement of “due process,” as it left non-union employees 
terminable at will without notice of the reasons or an opportunity to contest them.18  The 
16
 I draw the following description of the New Deal “constitution of the workplace” and its subsequent 
amendment from Cynthia Estlund, Working Together:  How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse 
Democracy (2003).
17
 See MILTON DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 1865-1965 (Urbana:  U. Ill. 
Press 1970); Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act:  Power, Symbol, and Workplace 
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1412-30 (1993). 
18
 Due process rights could be gained through collective bargaining; but the lack of a baseline just cause 
requirement made union organizing riskier by making it easier for an employer to get rid of a union 
supporter.  For while it is illegal to fire an employee for supporting a union, it may be difficult or 
impossible to prove the illegal motive, and it can take many years to get any relief even if the NLRB 
decides to pursue the claim; there is no private right of action.  See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful 
Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1674-78 (1996); Paul Weiler, Promises 
to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1795-
1803 (1983) (chroncling the long delays in NLRB proceedings from 1960 to 1980)..
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very partiality of the New Deal constitution of the workplace, and especially the 
opportunity it afforded for employer resistance to unionization, helps to explain the 
subsequent decline of unions and collective bargaining.  Still, the New Deal constitution 
designated the workplace as an appropriate domain of civil rights and liberties, and it 
established the legislatures’ power to intervene into the internal workings of private firms 
and to limit employer property rights in order to further employees’ freedom and self-
determination.19
The legislatures have made frequent use of that power, for the much chronicled 
decline of unions and collective bargaining since the 1950s has coincided with an 
upsurge in both judicially enforceable individual rights and administratively enforced 
labor standards.  The rights and regulatory models of workplace governance aim to 
supply for workers some of what the NLRA had sought to enable workers to secure for 
themselves – dignity, fair treatment, decent working conditions – and some of what was 
missing from the New Deal scheme – especially “equal protection” rights.  But the 
burgeoning body of “employment law” does nothing to restore or refurbish the New Deal 
commitment to workplace democracy.
A. The Proliferation of Labor Standards Laws
The New Deal, in which the template for the modern regulatory state was forged, 
was founded on the conviction that market mechanisms for the organization of the 
economy, albeit superior to the alternatives, were intrinsically flawed and prone to 
failure.  Regulatory agencies were established to protect the public interest against market 
malfunctions through the enactment and centralized enforcement of uniform rules and 
standards, later denominated “command-and-control.”  Alongside the NLRA’s re-
constitution of the framework for private bargaining, “command-and-control” gained a 
foothold in the New Deal workplace with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.20  The 
FLSA provided for a nationwide minimum wage and an overtime premium – time-and-a-
half beyond forty hours – for much of the private sector labor market.  Enforcement was 
19
 See generally Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of 
Democracy:  Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689.  
20
 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2000).
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chiefly by the Department of Labor, though employees could also sue on their own 
behalf.  
So substantive regulation of labor standards was no more foreign to the New Deal 
scheme than was the recognition of employee rights.  Still, the FLSA was seen as 
secondary to and largely supportive of collective bargaining.21  The expected upsurge in 
unionization and collective bargaining was to be the primary vehicle for improving wages 
and working conditions in the leading economic sectors.  Similarly, the Social Security 
Act established a minimal system of retirement security, leaving individuals and unions 
to bargain with employers for more generous retirement benefits.22  Taken together, the 
New Deal legislation established a floor on some basic economic terms of employment 
but left most terms and conditions to the newly established regime of collective 
bargaining or, outside the union sector, to individual contract.  
By the late 1960s, the problem of workplace disease and injury – left untouched by 
the New Deal and in the hands of the states23 – again loomed large on the national 
agenda.  Even in those industries and firms in which they were well established, unions 
had often proven unable or unwilling to bargain effectively over health and safety issues.  
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) sought to take workplace 
safety out of competition by establishing minimum standards through regulation.24  Also 
in the 1970s, Congress confronted the chronic failings of the private pension system, and 
put in place a set of detailed regulations for the administration and funding of employee 
pension and benefit plans, along with an insurance-based scheme for the partial rescue of 
21
 See Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 
7, 9 (1988).
22
 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2000).  
23
 The problem of compensation for industrial injuries – a recurring source of legal and political turmoil 
over the previous half-century – had recently been channeled out of tort law and into state workers’ 
compensation systems.  John F. Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows 
and the Remaking of American Law (2004).  But prevention remained the province of a patchwork of state 
laws. See Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Injunctions Against Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work 
Under Safe Conditions, 64 Cal. L. Rev. 702, 722-23 (1976); 
24
 S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-16 
(1970).
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failed pension plans.25  Later came the WARN Act of 1988, which required employers to 
give employees advance notice of plant closings and mass layoffs,26 and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993, which regulated parental and medical leave policies.27
All of these enactments were major victories for organized labor, the leading 
proponent of workplace legislation – especially minimum standards legislation – that 
benefits employees, union and non-union alike.  In hindsight, however, these regulatory 
statutes foreshadowed the eclipse of the collective bargaining model.  The statutes give 
unions barely a nod of recognition and a token role in enforcement.28  For employees 
without a union, the statutes afford no avenue for participation in enforcement, except for 
the right to file a complaint or to contact regulators.  The cumulative message of this rash 
of legislation was that it was through legislation, not through collective bargaining, that 
the most politically salient workplace issues were being addressed for most workers.29
The collective bargaining model was inadequate to deal with these problems, not only 
outside of its shrinking ambit but even within the organized workplace.  
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Employee Rights Revolution 
The idea of the workplace as a domain of civil rights and liberties, planted in the 
New Deal, was extended dramatically in 1964, when Congress enacted an “equal 
protection clause” for the workplace.30  The equal opportunity mandate of the Civil 
Rights Act, which initially proscribed discrimination based on race, sex, religion, color, 
and national origin, has proven to be both formidable and adaptable.  It was extended in 
stages to reach discrimination based on age, pregnancy, and disability.31   All of these 
25
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, ---
26 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq.
27 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2003).
28
 See James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 
1563 (1996).
29
 As James Brudney has shown, the congressional shift away from “group action” toward regulations 
(as well as individual rights) may have taken a toll even on the judicial interpretation of the labor laws.  
Brudney, supra note --, at 1569-72.
30
 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(2000)).
31
 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub.L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (2000)); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 95-555 (codified at 42 
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statutory equality rights were made enforceable both by public agencies and by private 
individuals, but in either case in court.  Critically, individuals could sue on their own 
behalf and recover attorneys fees if successful.32  Many plaintiffs could seek a jury trial 
and could recover compensatory and exemplary damages, not just backpay.33
Employees had gained some basic rights in the New Deal, but their vindication had 
been channeled away from courts and lawyers.  The Civil Rights Act appointed courts 
and lawyers as the leading agents of civil rights enforcement, and brought them into the 
process of defining employee rights.  Creative lawyers translated the experiences of 
aggrieved individuals into new legal theories of discrimination, and courts sometimes 
responded by striking down employer policies with a statistically “disparate impact” on 
protected groups,34 the imposition of sexual demands on employees,35 and the creation of 
a discriminatory “hostile environment.”36
Employment discrimination law gave momentum to the idea of the workplace as a 
domain of legally cognizable rights and liberties, and helped inspire a new wave of legal 
demands for protection of privacy and dignity on and off the job, and for freedoms of 
belief, association, and expression at work.  Of course, those claims were up against the 
venerable doctrine of employment at will, and employers’ presumptive power to 
terminate employment at any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.  But 
the civil rights laws had dealt a mortal blow to the legitimacy of employers’ claimed right 
to fire employees for “bad reasons” and opened the door to judicial recognition of other 
unacceptably bad reasons for discharge and other employee rights on the job.37
U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
12101 (2000)).
32
 Compare NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (2000) with Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 
(2000).
33
 Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, race discrimination plaintiffs could seek damages, and a jury 
trial, by using 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000), alongside Title VII.  After the 1991 amendments, a jury trial and 
damages (subject to caps) were available under Title VII itself.
34
 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35
 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (1977).  
36
 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
37
 See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989) (random drug 
testing); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Ore. 1975) (serving jury duty); Petermann v. Int’l Brotherhood of 
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Most of the law of wrongful discharge and of individual employee rights outside of 
the antidiscrimination statutes is state law, and much of it judge-made common law; 
employee rights thus vary dramatically from state to state and often unpredictably from 
case to case.38  Even when they are recognized, these employee rights are circumscribed 
by deference to managerial prerogatives.  Given the cost of litigation and the difficulty of 
proving the requisite unlawful motive, many employees are still unable or unwilling –
given the costs and burdens of litigation – to mount a legal challenge to a discharge or 
other adverse action they believe to be illegal .  Still, employees face a vastly more 
congenial legal regime than they did before 1964.  The malleable vehicle of tort law, 
fueled by the interests of aggrieved individuals and their entrepreneurial attorneys, has 
generated a dynamic body of “wrongful discharge” law, and, along with it, a rudimentary 
body of employee rights against employers.  
It is also clear that wrongful discharge liability, whether it flows from tort law or 
from the tort-like vehicle of antidiscrimination law, has had some of the deterrent impact 
that tort liability is supposed to have:  It has induced employers to take precautions 
against liability.  Some of those precautions aim simply to minimize liability by avoiding, 
concealing, or even destroying evidence of a discriminatory motive.39  But some 
employer precautions aim to minimize “accidents” – that is, decisions that might appear 
discriminatory – by creating internal procedures for the review and appeal of disciplinary 
and discharge decisions.40  There is little doubt that personnel practices and workplace 
demographics have been dramatically transformed in response to the threat of 
employment litigation and liability.  
At least in principle, the legal rights of employees and the corresponding 
limitations on employer power that have developed since 1964 provide rudimentary 
analogues to the constitutional rights of citizens as against the government.  One is 
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (refusing to give perjured testimony).
38
 Compare, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (employee fired for 
filing a worker’s compensation claim stated wrongful discharge claim), with Shick v. Shirey, 691 A.2d 511 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (no claim stated).
39
 Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment 
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 959, 967-71 (1999).
40
 Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due 
Process in the American Workplace, 95 Am. J. Soc. 1401, 1422-35 (1990).
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tempted as well to see in these doctrines a revival of the New Deal conception of 
employees as “citizens” of the workplace.  But these were citizens without representation, 
for none of these innovations in “employment law” incorporated any role for employees 
to participate in workplace decisionmaking.     
So the law of the workplace, once dominated by New Deal “labor law” and the 
collective bargaining model it established, is now dominated by regulatory statutes 
administered by government agencies and by individual rights enforceable through 
private litigation.  This shift has fundamentally altered the law’s conception of employees 
and their role:  The rights-litigation model of wrongful discharge law casts employees as 
rights-bearers, but also, and perhaps more visibly, as victims seeking redress for past 
wrongs.  The regulatory model renders employees the passive beneficiaries of the 
government’s protection.  Neither conceives of employees, as the NLRA does, as citizens 
sharing in the governance of the workplace.  Especially in the wake of union decline, 
modern employment law suffers from a serious “democratic deficit.”  That democratic 
deficit has become particularly disquieting as the enforcement of rights and regulations 
has been pulled increasingly into the firm itself, through parallel trends toward “self-
regulation” and internalization in the enforcement of both labor standards and employee 
rights.   
III. The Emergence of Employer “Self-Regulation” in the Enforcement of Rights 
and Regulatory Norms
The proliferation of rights and regulations has come at some cost to employers:  the 
costs of liability and litigation, the costs of compliance or of non-compliance, and the 
cost of having employer discretion constrained and second-guessed by judges and 
regulators.  Not surprisingly, employers have looked for ways to reduce the reach and 
impact of these legal regimes.  At the same time, the regimes of regulation and litigation 
have had their critics among scholars and friends of employees as well.  Much of the 
commentary has converged upon the concepts of “voluntary compliance” and self-
regulation, forms of which have emerged in both the regulatory and the rights arenas.41
41
 For a skeptical view of these developments, and particularly the lack of empirical support for their 
effectiveness in improving compliance, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
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A. The Privatization of Rights Enforcement:  Diversity Programs, Internal 
Dispute Resolution, and Mandatory Arbitration 
There is no doubt that the threat of large damage awards and bad publicity in 
employment litigation has captured the attention of employers.  They have responded to 
the growth of employment litigation with complaints about escalating costs, burdens, and 
threats to American competitiveness, and with appeals for legislative relief.42  But the 
substance of employee rights, and especially rights against various forms of 
discrimination, has been surprisingly resistant to those appeals.  Indeed, the formal reach 
of federal antidiscrimination legislation has only expanded in the last forty years to reach 
new groups, new forms of discrimination, and additional remedies.  In the legislative 
arena, the antidiscrimination principle has proven to be nearly a one-way ratchet.  
As a consequence, employers’ efforts to tame the litigation “explosion” has taken 
different forms.  In particular it has induced them to engage in self-regulatory modes of 
litigation avoidance and management.  Recall again Wal-Mart’s announcement of 
sweeping new compliance and diversity programs in the aftermath of the certification of 
a massive class action in pending sex discrimination litigation.  It is hard to know how 
big a role litigation avoidance has played in the growth of “workforce diversity” 
programs.  But clearly those programs can help to avoid the kind of statistical disparities 
that got Wal-Mart into trouble and that are the single most damning body of evidence in 
the case.  No major company wants to be the next Wal-Mart, the next Coca-Cola, or the 
next Texaco on that score.  So fear of litigation has helped to change patterns of hiring 
and promotions, at least in major firms.  
Litigation has also made a big mark on how firms deal with discipline, discharge, 
and other disputes with employees.  In particular, employers, at the urging of human 
relations professionals and employment lawyers, have crafted “alternative dispute 
resolution” mechanisms inside organizations to stem the tide of legal claims and to 
reduce their cost.  The proliferation of internal grievance procedures and
Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). Most of the programs studied lacked many crucial 
safeguards discussed below.
42
 Complaints about the “litigation crisis” were found to be pervasive in the human relations literature, 
though largely overstated.  See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The 
Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 47 (1992).
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antidiscrimination policies and the rise of mandatory arbitration of employees’ legal 
claims both reflect to some degree the efforts of organizations to tame the threat of 
litigation.  They both seek to ameliorate the tension between outside legal norms and 
internal organizational needs, partly by bringing the organization into closer conformance 
with the outside norms, and partly by domesticating those outside norms and the means 
of their enforcement.  They both represent nascent forms of “self-regulation” in the 
enforcement of employee rights.43
1. From Litigation Avoidance to Liability Shield:  The Legalization of Corporate 
Antidiscrimination Policy  
“Corporate due process” systems – non-union grievance and dispute resolution 
procedures – have proliferated in the past several decades, especially in large firms.  The 
procedures vary in their complexity, from simple “open-door” policies to multi-step 
grievance procedures involving peer review, mediation, and arbitration.  They typically 
invite a broad range of grievances or disputes, regardless of whether they have a legal 
basis; and they cover broad swaths of the workforce.  They generally culminate in a 
decision by a somewhat-disinterested company official and only rarely before a 
genuinely neutral third party (though I will turn shortly to the important phenomenon of 
mandatory arbitration).  
These systems have many benefits.  Employees feel more fairly treated; these good 
feelings are thought to enhance employee morale, longevity, and performance, and to 
quell interest in unionization.  Moreover, these systems allow management to rationalize 
discipline, monitor supervisors, and avoid mistakes.  That being said, it is clear that the 
threat of litigation – especially over discharge and harassment claims under the 
antidiscrimination laws – helped to spur the dramatic growth of these systems in 
medium- and large-sized firms.44  It has become near-gospel among human relations 
professionals that corporate due process systems help to avoid litigation by resolving
43
 For a leading account of how employment discrimination law is leading firms to find new ways to 
maintain and manage diverse workforces, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001).
44
 Lauren Edelman, Christopher Uggen, & Howard Erlanger, The Endogenity of Legal Regulation: 
Grievance Procedures As Rational Myth, 105 Am. J. Soc. 406, 408 (1999); Lauren B. Edelman et al., 
Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 47, 
74-79 (1992).
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disputes within the firm and by flagging and permitting the correction of actions that may 
be found or plausibly claimed to be discriminatory.45
The growth of corporate due process illustrates one important way in which 
wrongful discharge law, and especially antidiscrimination law, has penetrated the 
workplace and transformed at least the outward manifestations of workplace 
decisionmaking:  Antiharassment policies prohibit a wide range of speech and conduct 
that some workers might find offensive on the basis of race, sex, age, or other suspect 
criteria.  Managers and supervisors are trained to avoid referring to these same traits in 
connection with employment decisions.  In other workplaces, ambitious workforce 
diversity programs reach deeper into the reform of workplace culture.  In a variety of 
ways, modern human relations policies adopted in the wake of the employment rights 
revolution have brought those external legal rights inside the workplace.  
Indeed, they have done more than that, for, under many corporate due process 
regimes, not only legally actionable disputes but other complaints of unfair treatment 
may receive “some kind of hearing,” usually before a relatively dispassionate company 
official.  At a minimum these procedures afford a sober second look and some protection 
against the personal tyranny of low-level supervisors; at best they administer a dose of 
procedural regularity and soften the sharp edges of employment at will.  In effect, the 
“equal protection clause” of the workplace has helped to generate a modicum of “due 
process” for non-union employees in many large and medium-sized organizations.  
Internal grievance procedures and diversity programs alike have been criticized for 
their failure to fully realize employee rights.  At the same time, those policies have 
operated to “domesticate” legal rights.  Internal grievance processes, for example, tend to 
assimilate complaints of discrimination to other complaints of unfair treatment, and 
indeed to the ordinary run of personnel conflicts.46  They tend to tame external law, 
45
 In fact it is unclear whether an internal dispute resolution system reduces the incidence of litigation or 
outside complaints (e.g., with the EEOC).  See Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, supra note --, at 431-32.  
Some advisors also claimed that the existence of these mechanisms could serve as a partial shield against 
liability by convincing adjudicators of the fairness of the employer’s decisionmaking.  Until recently, there 
was little doctrinal basis for that proposition.  Id. at 444-45.  However, the law has recently come to 
partially vindicate the HR advice.  Id. at 435-36.  See infra pp. --.
46 See Lauren B. Edelman et al ., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 Am J. Soc. 
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bending it to fit organizational needs.  So long as internal grievance procedures played no 
direct role in the adjudication of formal legal complaints, their tendency to domesticate, 
and perhaps distort, external law to suit the needs of the organization was of limited 
significance to the enforcement of legal rights.  These internal systems might avoid some 
discrimination, or correct it; or they might dissuade individuals from pursuing legal 
complaints by assuaging their sense of grievance or by reconstructing their understanding 
of what happened.  But they afforded no immunity from liability.  If a complaint was 
nonetheless filed, it would follow the course charted by the relevant statute and public 
enforcement agencies, and proceed to some kind of resolution (or not), without regard to 
its fate within the corporate hierarchy.  
That changed with the Supreme Court’s 1998 decisions in Burlington Industries v. 
Ellerth47 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,48 in which the Supreme Court established 
standards by which employers could be held liable for sexual harassment committed by 
supervisors.49  The Court reaffirmed the proposition that employers were generally liable 
for unlawful discrimination – including discriminatory harassment – within the 
organization regardless of whether high-level company officials knew or approved of the 
unlawful conduct.  However, with respect to one important category of discrimination –
the creation of a discriminatory hostile environment without any tangible adverse 
employment action – the Court recognized an affirmative defense against employer 
liability.  The employer can escape liability by showing that it “exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and that the employee 
“unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”50  While the Court did not 
explicitly require employers to adopt internal antiharassment policies and procedures, its 
decisions certified those policies as the surest path to the partial immunity offered by the 
1589 (2001); Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen, & Howard Erlanger, Internal Dispute Resolution: 
The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 Law & Soc'y Rev. 497 (1993).
47
 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
48
 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
49
 The Faragher and Ellerth decisions were foreshadowed by Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 72 (1986), which indicated that the existence of an adequate grievance procedure might under some 
circumstances insulate an employer from liability for some harassment by supervisors.   
50
 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807
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affirmative defense.
The Faragher and Ellerth decisions seemed to discourage any near-term extension 
of the affirmative “self-regulation” defense to discrimination claims involving tangible 
adverse action such as discharge, denial of promotion or demotion, pay disparities, or the 
like.  But the Supreme Court took the next step down that road just one year later.  In 
Kolstad v. American Dental Association,51 the Court held that “good faith efforts to 
comply with Title VII,”52 in the form of antidiscrimination policies and procedures,
would bar punitive damages against the employer for intentional discrimination by 
managers in promotions and presumably discharges.  Insofar as much of employers’ 
litigation anxiety focuses on the (very small) risk of very large jury verdicts, this holding 
greatly magnified the significance of internal antidiscrimination policies.
Both Faragher’s affirmative defense and Kolstad’s defense against punitive 
damages come into play only when there has already been proof of intentionally 
discriminatory conduct by supervisory or managerial officials.  They allow the 
employer’s internal, self-regulatory efforts to avoid discrimination to bar or substantially 
reduce liability for discrimination that has demonstrably occurred, sometimes at high 
levels within the organization.  With these few decisions, the Supreme Court rapidly 
transformed employers’ internal compliance and grievance procedures into front line 
mechanisms for enforcing antidiscrimination law.  This is not wholesale self-regulation, 
for the doctrine affords at least the potential for oversight of these procedures by the 
public institutions – the courts – to which enforcement had been delegated by the 
legislatures.  Under Faragher the employer’s antiharassment policies and practices must 
be “reasonable” to bar liability (and the employer bears the burden of proof on that 
point), and under Kolstad, the employer’s internal antidiscrimination practices must 
demonstrate “good faith” to bar punitive damages.  In principle the courts are enjoined to 
distinguish sham processes from effective ones.    
If these internal procedures work – if they do reduce the incidence of discrimination 
and harassment and deliver a quicker and more cost-effective form of recourse to 
51
 526 U.S. 527 (1999).
52
 Id. at 544.
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aggrieved employees – then they will represent a significant step forward in the 
enforcement of anti-harassment and antidiscrimination norms.  On the other hand, if 
judicial oversight is inadequate and litigation ends up being barred by a mere pretense of 
internal process, then employers may be able to insulate themselves from the litigation 
threat that has driven much internal workplace reform.  The result may be a disguised 
form of deregulation under the guise of self-regulation.  That is a serious risk with a 
doctrine that rewards employers not for successfully preventing discrimination and 
harassment from occurring – after all, the procedures only matter when actionable 
misconduct did in fact take place within the organization – but for convincing a court that 
they tried to prevent it,or would have tried if the complainant had come forward.  
Unfortunately, there is a distressing paucity of evidence about how well these internal 
enforcement systems actually perform, and whether they succeed in protecting employee 
rights.53  But the chorus of judicial complaints about the growing burden of employment 
litigation (and, more privately, about the marginal quality of the discrimination claims 
that reach them) gives reason to fear that judges may be predisposed to sign off on these 
internal procedures without close scrutiny. 54
2. Mandatory Arbitration and the Privatization of Public Law Enforcement
The rise of mandatory arbitration represents a further step toward privatizing and 
domesticating the enforcement of employees’ legal rights.  In a pair of decisions a decade 
apart – Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.55 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams56
– the Supreme Court upheld the enforceability of employees’ agreements to submit any 
future legal claims against the employer, including statutory discrimination claims, to an 
arbitrator rather than to a court.  Most courts have read these decisions as affirming 
employers’ ability to demand such agreements as a condition of employment.57  In the 
53
 See Kimberly Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash U. 
L.Q. 487, 511-15.
54 Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 
Am. J. Soc., 406, 412 (1999).
55
 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
56
 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
57
 See, by contrast, California law, under which an agreement secured on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a 
condition of employment is held to be “procedurally unconscionable,” and invalid if it also contains 
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past decade, employers, and especially larger employers, have turned increasingly to pre-
dispute mandatory arbitration agreements as a way to take employment disputes out of 
the public courts and into the more private and party-controlled arbitral forum.
One might quibble with my characterization of arbitration as a form of self-
regulation.58  In principle, these agreements merely substitute one neutral outside forum 
for another; to be valid, they must preserve statutory rights and remedies.59  But 
employers write the arbitration agreements; they determine in the first instance how the 
process works and how arbitrators will be chosen.  They do so subject to the power of 
courts to reject or to redact unfair or legally invalid provisions.  But judicial supervision 
is episodic, and it often takes a form that does little to discourage employers from 
overreaching.  A court faced with an invalid clause – say, one that bars the award of 
attorneys’ fees to prevailing discrimination plaintiffs – might simply strike the clause (or 
“blue-pencil” the agreement) while enforcing the rest of the agreement, in which case 
employers who include such invalid clauses risk nothing and may gain by deterring some 
litigation.  Or a court might enforce the agreement to arbitrate, leaving the contested issue 
to arbitration and post-arbitration judicial review, at which point traditional judicial 
deference to arbitration awards may trump the supervisory impulse. 60  In the meantime, 
prospective plaintiffs and their attorneys bear the burden of uncertainty and may be 
deterred from proceeding.  The upshot is that employers gain considerable control over 
the adjudicatory process by securing arbitration agreements.  Their control and their 
provisions that are “substantively unconscionable,” that is, “unduly harsh or oppressive.”  See Armendariz 
v. Found. Health Psychcare Svcs., Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669, 690 (2000); Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2001).
58
 Paul Carrington went one step further, calling the wholesale move toward mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration, especially of consumer claims, a form of “self-deregulation.”  See Paul D. Carrington Self-
deregulation, the “National Policy” of the Supreme Court, 3 Nev. L.J. 259 (2003).  But he portrayed 
employment arbitration as comparatively even-handed as a result of judicial oversight and arbitral self-
regulation in the form of the Due Process Protocol discussed below. 
59
 See Gilmer; Spinetti v. Service Corp. Intern., 324 F.3d 212 (3rd Cir, 2003) (invalidating fee provisions 
contrary to Title VII);  Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 317 F.3d 646 (invalidating cost-splitting and 
limitation-of-remedies provisions contrary to Title VII).
60
 See George Watts & Son In. v. Tiffany & Co.,  248 F. 3d  577 (7th Cir. 2001), a non-Title VII case, in 
which the court held that an arbitrator’s refusal to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff, as 
authorized by the statute under which plaintiff's claim was brought, cannot be vacated on the ground that it 
was in “manifest disregard of law.”  In essence the court held that legal error is grounds for vacating an 
arbitrator's award only if the award itself violates the law.  Citing Eastern Ass’d Coal.
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incentive to exercise it effectively is enhanced by their posture as likely “repeat players” 
who foresee repeated resort to the arbitration process in a range of legal disputes.  So it is 
fair to describe arbitration as a form of employer self-regulation – not wholesale self-
regulation but more or less regulated self-regulation.  
It is precisely the self-regulatory aspect of arbitration that troubles many scholars 
and employee advocates.  Even apart from employers’ ability to skew particular terms in 
their favor, arbitration subjects public law rights to interpretation and adjudication by 
private decisionmakers.61  Arbitration proceedings are generally private, and awards are 
not necessarily explained or published.  Those are among its attractions to publicity-
averse employers.
Much of the heat in the debate over mandatory arbitration, however, is generated by 
the belief that arbitration reduces expected recoveries for plaintiffs (and employers’ 
incentive to respect employee rights).  Studies do indicate that awards to plaintiffs are 
lower in arbitration; but there is also evidence that plaintiffs win more often in arbitration 
than in court,62 and that more employees bring claims under an arbitration regime.63  That 
leads some observers to question the conventional wisdom that arbitration favors 
employers.  They contend that arbitration is less costly and more accessible than litigation 
– a claim for which the evidence is also decidedly mixed64 – and may put a fair hearing 
within the reach of many claimants who could not file a lawsuit, much less get a judicial 
61
 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:  The 
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 Denver U. L. Rev. 1017 (1996); Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 
685 (2004).
62
 See Maltby, supra, at 46.  Most litigated employment disputes are resolved on dispositive motions, 
not at trial; and the overwhelming majority of those motions are won by employers.  Arbitration 
traditionally has no dispositive motions but resolves cases “on the merits.”  See Maltby at 47.
63
 Largely for this reason, some commentators strongly dispute the claim that arbitration is 
advantageous for employers.  See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from 
Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers L.J. 399 (2000).
64
 For a review of evidence that arbitration is cheaper and faster, see Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for 
Rickshaws:  The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 Ohio St. J. 
on Dispute Resolution 559, 564-65 (2001); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice, Employment Arbitration and 
Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 29, 45-51 (1998).  For studies indicating that arbitration is often 
as costly or more costly, see Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts' 
Use of Antisuit Injunction Against Courts, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91, 126 (1998); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931, 959 & 
n.161 (1999).  Part of the concern is with arbitrators’ fees that often reach five figures.  
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hearing.  If the process were indeed cheaper and faster, and if plaintiffs made up for 
lower awards with higher claim rates and win rates, then arbitration could expand 
employees’ access to “some kind of a hearing” before a neutral decisionmaker without 
reducing the overall impact of employees’ legal rights.65
Much will turn on how these arbitration procedures work and how effectively the 
courts supervise them.  But we have already observed that the prevailing modes of 
judicial supervision fail to deter even some blatant forms of employer overreaching.  
More subtle concerns, such as the impartiality of arbitrators and the adequacy of awards, 
may effectively be screened off from effective supervision, especially if the courts adopt 
the deferential standard of review that is traditional for arbitation awards.  The difficulty 
of outside judicial monitoring of the fairness of arbitration suggests the importance of 
what happens inside – within the firm-led process of formulating the ground rules of 
arbitration.  In the context of labor arbitration under collective bargaining agreements, 
the fairness of the process is safeguarded not by judicial review, which is very limited, 
but by the role of unions in establishing procedures and selecting arbitrators.  Under 
individual arbitration agreements, by contrast, employees have no collective 
representation or experience, and no role in the establishment of arbitration procedures.  
In theory, individual employees choose whether to accept the arbitration agreements 
drafted by employers; in fact, nobody believes that employees who can lawfully be put to 
a choice between signing the agreement and losing or foregoing employment have any 
real choice in the matter.66
For the moment, the initiative is in the hands of employers, who typically adopt 
these agreements unilaterally and impose them on employees with little or no pretense of 
negotiation or even real consent.67  The courts are reduced to a largely reactive role of 
65
 See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: 
Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1998); Estreicher, supra 
note 57, at 564-65.  
66
 See, e.g. Stone, supra note 56, at 1037-38.
67
 For example, the Texas Supreme Court has held that the imposition of mandatory arbitration – that is, 
the waiver of the statutory right to a judicial forum for discrimination claims – was like any other 
modification to an at-will employment contract:  “[W]hen an employer notifies an employee of changes to 
the at-will employment contract and the employee ‘continues working with knowledge of the changes, he 
has accepted the changes as a matter of law.’”  In re Halliburton, 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002).
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approving or disapproving the provisions that employers devise.  Employers are 
effectively engaged in a process of “self-regulation” in the matter of rights enforcement 
under the supervision – more or less vigilant – of the courts.  
B. From Demands for “Deregulation” to “Self-Regulation” of Labor Standards
The viability of “command-and-control” regulatory schemes has, since the 1970s, 
come under challenge from many directions.  One critique, particularly salient in the 
labor standards context, portrays the main problem as one of underenforcement:  not 
enough inspectors, not enough penalties, not enough deterrence or compliance.68  But the 
opposite critique has been at least as voluble, as business interests pleaded for 
“deregulation” in the interest of competitiveness and flexibility.69  They did not get much 
deregulation, even during the Reagan administration, though they did get lengthy 
processes of administrative and judicial review, procedural constraints on inspections and 
enforcement, and reduced funding, all of which impaired the efficacy of agencies such as 
OSHA.70
Business interests gained an increasingly respectful hearing as they changed their 
tune in the 1990s from the tendentious call for “deregulation” to the kinder and gentler 
pursuit of “self-regulation” and “voluntary compliance.”  Those concepts resonated with 
growing confidence in markets and private ordering, which had rebounded rather robustly 
from its post-Depression nadir.  Changes in the economy – away from mass production, 
toward increasingly agile forms of production, porous product markets, and transnational 
corporate structures – helped to produce an economic justification and a political demand 
for “flexibility.”  From the pro-regulatory side as well, however, uniform and centrally-
administered standards and the lengthy process for developing and enforcing those 
standards appeared increasingly out of step with the fluid and fast-moving character of 
production.  Together these developments have converged to yield a growing conviction 
68
 See Thomas McGarity &Sydney Shapiro, Workers At Risk:  The Failed Promise of the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (1993). 
69
 See Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness (1982)
70
 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Degregulation Debate 
(1992).
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that traditional “command-and-control” regulatory approaches are anachronistic –
ineffectual at best, counterproductive at worst.71  Growing doubts about the viability of 
command-and-control have not made major inroads on the basic federal labor standards 
statutes themselves.72  Still, regulatory agencies have cautiously experimented with forms 
of “voluntary compliance” and self-regulation within the confines of command-and-
control statutes.73  A few examples, to which I will return throughout this paper, will help 
ground the discussion.
1. Illustrations from Occupational Safety and Health Regulation
OSHA, a political lightning rod since its birth in 1970, has undertaken cautious yet 
controversial experimentation with “cooperative” approaches to securing compliance.74
The most ambitious program of self-regulation is OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Program 
(VPP), first established in 1982.  Under the VPP, employers who demonstrate their 
commitment and internal organizational capacity to comply with health and safety 
standards and to improve their safety records can get taken off the ordinary inspection 
schedule and effectively put onto a more conciliatory enforcement track.  Employers 
must also demonstrate that employees are “involved” in the safety program, though in the 
non-union context employees participate largely as individual volunteers.  I will return to 
the employee involvement feature of the VPP below.  
The VPP, started during the Reagan administration at the height of deregulatory 
fervor, is a modest program squeezed into the interstices of a command-and-control 
71
 Daniel Yergin & Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy 
(2002); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 
267 (1998).
72
 In some cases, the fear of employee advocates that regulatory reform is a disguise for deregulation, 
and of employer allies that it is a stalking horse for union organizing, seems to have activated the latent risk 
of legislative deadlock that chronically plagues the politics of labor legislation.  See infra TAN ---
73
 For two early and encouraging studies of self-regulation and cooperative regulation of workplace 
health and safety outside of OSHA, see John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal 
Mine Safety (1985) (arguing that cooperative approach promotes coal mine safety); Joseph V. Rees, 
Reforming the Workplace: A Study of Self-Regulation in Occupational Safety (1988) (finding improved 
safety under “mandated self-regulation” in California). 
74
 For an overview of cooperative initiatives within OSHA enforcement, see Sydney Shapiro & Randy 
Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 
Admin. L. Rev. 713 (1997).  For a more theoretical assessment of the conditions necessary for effective 
“cooperative” compliance, see Sydney Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in 
Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 97 (2000).
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statute.  But the program proved to be both effective and politically popular.75  It became 
a building block of a more comprehensive reform effort in the Clinton administration as 
part of its “Reinventing Government” initiative.  The administration announced in 1995 
that “OSHA will change its fundamental operating paradigm from one of command and 
control to one that provides employers a real choice between a partnership and a 
traditional enforcement relationship.”76  The program offered partnership, cooperation, 
and compliance assistance to employers who maintained a good safety record and an 
effective safety program, while aiming to preserve and even strengthen traditional 
adversarial enforcement mechanisms for employers who put workers at risk.  
The effort to tap into regulatory resources within the firm had been at the center of 
proposed OSHA reform legislation in the early 1990s.  Among other things, the law 
would have mandated the creation of workplace health and safety committees at most 
sizable workplaces.77  Such committees might have played a crucial role in extending the 
reach of an overextended enforcement aparatus by activating regulatory resources and 
impulses within firms.78  But the legislation became entangled in the chronic gridlock of 
“labor law reform”:  the idea of employee safety committees triggered both employer 
fears of union organizing and union fears of employer domination and manipulation.79
Gridlock at the federal level has not entirely squelched innovation at the state level.  
75
 http://www.vpppa.org/GovAffairs/Appropriations.cfm
76
 President Clinton & Vice President Gore, The New OSHA - Reinventing Safety and Health, issued 
May 16, 1995; available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/initiati/common/reinvent-.htm
77 See H.R. 1280, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 3160, 102nd Cong. (1991).
78 Studies have recognized the effectiveness of employee safety committees in improving safety.  See 
Gregory R. Watchman, Safe and Sound: The Case for Safety and Health Committees Under OSHA and the 
NLRA, 4 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 65, 82–89 (1994); Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, Designing 
Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33 Cornell Int’l L.J. 
373, 431 (2000).  See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as 
the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 411, 497–98 (2000) (recognizing success of 
employee safety committees in reducing accident rates at California construction sites, but concluding that 
effectiveness of these committees in other contexts “remains an open question”).
79 See Rabinowitz & Hager, supra note --, at 431 (stating that legislation requiring employee safety 
committees was “strongly opposed by the business community”); Kenneth A. Kovach, et al., OSHA and 
the Politics of Reform: An Analysis of OSHA Reform Initiatives Before the 104th Congress, 34 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 169, 175 (1997) (reporting union fears that employer controlled safety committees might become 
anti-union devices); Seidenfeld, supra note --, at 500 (reporting union fears of employer domination and 
employer fears of independent employee representation).  
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OSHA preempts some state regulation of workplace health and safety, but it expressly 
authorizes states to operate their own approved safety and health plans pursuant to 
OSHA, and leaves states with considerable authority and room for innovation in this area.  
Some states have used that authority to promote self-regulatory activity by employers.   
Nearly a dozen states have mandated the creation of workplace health and safety 
committees along the lines of what federal OSHA reform proposals would have 
required.80  Those mandatory committees are more likely to be instituted, and appear to 
do more to improve enforcement, in union workplaces than in non-union workplaces; 
still, they do appear to ratchet up agency enforcement activity.81   Though the data do not 
go so far, one may reasonably infer that such committees also stimulate greater internal 
compliance, and create safer workplaces, by abating hazards without agency 
involvement.  
Other states have made further steps in the direction of employer self-regulation.  
The most ambitious and innovative of state workplace health and safety programs is in 
California, which has instituted a form of mandatory self-regulation.82  Since 1991, all 
covered employers have been required to put in place a Workplace Injury and Illness 
Prevention Program.83  An employer who maintains a program that tracks the 
recommended “model program” will avoid civil penalties for a first violation.84  The 
program must include regular self-inspections, identification and abatement of hazards, 
training of and regular communication with employees, and establishment of a system for 
confidential employee reporting of hazards.  A similar set of requirements is imposed in 
New York for employers with worse-than-average injury rates.85  These programs 
80
 See Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral 
Representationa, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 75, 95-100 
(2002).  
81
 See David Weil, Are Mandated Health and Safety Committees Substitutes for or Supplements to 
Labor Unions?, 52 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 339 (1999).
82
 The program is described in Rees, supra note ---.
83
 See Cal. Labor Code 6401.7.  A guide to setting up the program can be found on-line at 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dosh/dosh_publications/iipp.html.
84
 Cal. Labor Code 6401.7(J)(1). 
85
 Specifically, employers with annual revenues over $800,000 and a workers’ compensation 
“experience rating” above 1.2 (i.e., 1.2 times average in the industry).  McKinney’s Workers’ 
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represent a decidedly regulated version of self-regulation; yet they do recognize and 
reward the regulatory potential within firms – the particularized expertise and awareness 
of hazards and the potential for customized forms of hazard abatement.
So the move to push regulatory activity into the regulated firm itself has been 
pursued in different forms by regulators, employer advocates, and employee advocates.  
The recent controversy over OSHA’s ergonomic standards may illustrate how far the 
regulatory paradigm has moved in recent decades.86  Among the last acts of the Clinton 
Administration’s Department of Labor was the adoption of a long-awaited and 
exhaustively-vetted standard for the reduction of ergonomic hazards in the workplace.  
And among the first acts of the Bush Administration and the new Republican Congress 
that accompanied it into power was the recission of the ergonomics standard in favor of a 
system based largely on “voluntary compliance” and agency guidance.87  But this was no 
showdown between the proponents of “command and control” and the apostles of self-
regulation.  For the rescinded regulation itself administered a heavy dose of self-
regulation by requiring employers themselves to put in place mechanisms for recognizing 
and redressing potential ergonomic hazards.  The proposed regulation prescribed the 
establishment of certain internal procedures and institutional structures, while the 
substance of ergonomic practices was to be shaped almost entirely within firms 
themselves – drawing on public and private experience and guidance – in response to the 
very particular needs of the workplace and its workers.    
The second Bush Administration’s retreat from mandatory ergonomic regulation to 
“voluntary compliance” with ergonomic guidelines is emblematic of its widely-
advertised shift in emphasis within OSHA from enforcement to guidance and 
“compliance assistance.”  One might properly view with skepticism calls for “self-
Compensation Law § 134; NY ADC T. 12, Ch. I, Subch. A, Pt. 59.
86
 Steven Greenhouse, Senate Votes to Repeal Rules Clinton Set on Work Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 
2001, at A1 (describing President Bush’s unveiling of a new workplace safety policy that relies on 
“voluntary actions” by companies to reduce repetitive motion injuries in the workplace); Steven 
Greenhouse, Bush Plan to Avert Work Injuries Seeks Voluntary Steps by Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
2002, at A1 (discussing the repeal of repetitive motion workplace rules issued by OSHA five months 
earlier).
87
 The guidance was to be backed by limited case-by-case prosecution of obvious and serious 
ergonomic hazards under the “general duty clause” of OSHA.  
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regulation” by those who once touted the virtues of deregulation.  But it is important to 
recognize that the shifting of regulatory activity to the firm itself is not merely a partisan 
move that is likely to be reversed under a future Democratic administration.  That shift 
was embraced under the Clinton administration, and was a central feature of its effort to 
“reinvent government.”  
2. Illustrations from Wage and Hour Regulation  
Wage and hour regulation has been chronically plagued by underenforcement.  
Whenever there are workers willing to work for less than the law provides, producers 
have a dauntingly predictable incentive to pay them less.  Traditional enforcement 
mechanisms have often failed to raise the cost of non-compliance high enough to 
outweigh the immediate gains from non-compliance.88  That is especially true for 
marginal producers at the bottom of the production chain, who have little fixed capital or 
stake in their reputation, and who tend to operate under the regulatory radar.  
On the other hand, the possibilities for experimentation within the enforcement of 
wage and hour laws are amplified by some features that distinguish those laws from 
workplace health and safety laws:  First, the FLSA contains at least one novel and potent 
remedy, the “hot goods” embargo, which permits the DOL to stop commerce in goods 
produced in violation of the Act.  That gives the agency significant leverage to induce 
participation in novel forms of wage and hour enforcement.  There is nothing 
comparable, or comparably onerous, under OSHA.  Second, the FLSA only sets a floor 
on wage and hour regulation; states are otherwise free to regulate, and to devise new 
regulatory approaches.  OSHA, by contrast, preempts some state workplace safety 
regulation (that which addresses hazards regulated by OSHA), and puts some constraints 
on state experimentation.  Third, the availability of private rights of action, including 
aggregate forms of action, under the wage and hour laws has created an opening for 
“private attorneys general” to supplement government enforcement efforts.  These 
features of wage and hour regulation – potent public sanctions, parallel state regulation, 
88
 David Weil, Compliance With The Minimum Wage, Can Government Make A Difference?, 
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=368340.
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and private litigation – open up room for experimentation.  In the case of private 
litigation, that room remains largely unexplored, but I will return to it in Part V.
“Hot Goods” and Monitoring in Textiles:  The apparel industry is a low-wage sector 
with notoriously high rates of non-compliance with minimum wage and overtime pay 
requirements.89  In an effort to improve compliance among the low-wage, low-visibility 
workplaces at the bottom layers of the apparel sector, the Department of Labor (DOL) 
launched a program founded on the aggressive use of the longstanding but much-
neglected “hot-goods” provision of the FLSA, which allows the Secretary of Labor to 
petition to embargo goods produced in violation of the Act.  The interdiction of goods has 
two big advantages over traditional sanctions:  First, it hurts the large manufacturers (who 
supply finished apparel to retailers) a lot, especially in a retail market like fashion apparel 
that puts a high premium on speed of delivery.  Second, by targeting the goods 
themselves, the remedy cuts through contracting arrangements that may insulate 
manufacturers from liability for the substandard wages of workers at the bottom of the 
production chain.90  The embargo sanction and its threat give manufacturers an incentive 
to discover and fix compliance problems among their contractors at lower levels of the 
production chain.  The manufacturers’ capacity to discover and fix such problems was an 
outgrowth of developments in production itself, which bound manufacturers and 
contractors or “jobbers” closer together to the end of producing high quality goods in 
very short and fast production runs.91
Capitalizing on these features of the apparel industry, DOL deployed the threat of a 
“hot goods” embargo to induce manufacturers to agree to monitor the wage and hour 
practices of their own contractors.  The manufacturers entered into further agreements 
with their own contractors to abide by wage and hours laws, keep records, and submit to 
89
 Weil, supra note 79, at 7
90
 The statutory definition of “employer” in the FLSA is the broadest in American law.  Goldstein et al., 
Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory 
Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 983, 996-1003 (1999).  However, partly because of overly 
restrictive judicial interpretations, it still does not reach through many of the contractor arrangements that 
are typical in apparel and other manufacturing sectors, and that separate workers from financial responsible 
employers.  Id.   
91
 For a description of these arrangements in apparel, see Weil, supra note --.  For an account of how 
similar dynamics have come to characterize much of global manufacturing, see Sabel, supra note --, at --.
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inspections by representatives of the manufacturers or by outside monitors.  This program 
sought to leverage public enforcement powers to generate a system of private 
enforcement that was much more vigilant than a public agency could possibly be.  It is a 
form of “self-regulation” if one expands the regulated “self” to include the entire chain of 
interconnected albeit nominally independent entities on the production line.  Studies of 
the program’s effects have found improved (though hardly complete) compliance among 
participating contractors.92
The Green Grocer Code of Conduct:  Federalism is often touted as a cauldron of 
innovation.  A striking example of creative state enforcement of wage and hour laws –
one that suggests the potentialities of both federalism and self-regulation – can be found 
in New York City’s “green grocer” markets – the small retail produce markets that sprang 
up in the city in the 1980s.93  The story began with a coalition of worker advocates 
seeking to improve working conditions of the greengrocery workers.  They found a lot of 
wage and hour violations, and started bringing cases to the Attorney General’s Labor 
Bureau.  State investigations showed a nearly identical pattern of violations:  The workers 
were paid two to three hundred dollars a week for a 72 hour week.  Cases were nearly 
open-and-shut, and produced backpay liability that was often ruinous for these small 
businesses.  But case-by- case investigations proved unsatisfactory, given the AG’s 
limited resources and the large number of greengrocers in the city.  So once having 
gained the attention of employers, the AG brought representatives of employers and of 
labor to the bargaining table.94  Together they devised a “Green Grocer Code of Conduct” 
(GGCC).95
A merchant’s submission to and compliance with the GGCC secures a kind of 
92
 Weil, supra Note 79, at 22
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 See Matthew T. Bodie, The Potential for State Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of 
Conduct, 21 Hofstra L. & Empl. L. J. – (2004).  For a first-hand account of the negotiation of the 
agreement, see Matthew T. Bodie, The Story Behind the New York City Greengrocer Code of Conduct:  A 
Conversation with Patricia Smith, 6 Regional Lab. Rev. 19 (2004) (hereinafter “Smith Interview”).  
94
 The negotiations were made feasible in part by the fact that the green groceries were operated mostly 
by Koreans and Korean Americans, and were effectively represented by the Korean Produce Association.  
Employees, for their part, were mostly Mexican immigrants.  They were represented at the bargaining table 
by Casa Mexico, “a worker advocacy group … that deals with primarily Mexican workers.”  See Smith
Interview, supra note --, at 22-23. 
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 The text of the GGCC is available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/labor/ (visited 7/7/04).  
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provisional amnesty with respect to past violations of wage and hours laws.  The Code 
binds signatory employers to comply with wage and hours laws (as well as with other 
employment and labor laws), to keep records, to undergo training and to allow their 
employees to do so, to post notices advising employees of their rights, and, crucially, to 
submit to regular inspections by independent labor standards monitors appointed by the 
AG.  Monitors make unannounced visits to the workplaces, inspect employers’ payroll 
records, speak privately with employees about these issues, assist employers in 
compliance, and report on violations to the AG’s office and to a Code of Conduct 
Committee.  The Committee, which oversees the Code, deals with disputes, and certifies 
new signatories, consists of three members representing workers, employers, and the AG.  
Notably, the GGCC does provide for some forms of employee representation within 
the enforcement scheme.  Representatives of the state AFL-CIO, as well as Casa Mexico, 
an advocacy group for Mexican-American workers, who make up most of the affected 
labor force, participated in the creation of the Code.  One of the three members of the 
Code of Conduct Committee is appointed by Casa Mexico.96  And for shops with more 
than ten employees, the Code provides for appointment of an employee spokesperson by 
the monitor, after consultation with employees.  Unfortunately, the latter innovation 
appears to be largely symbolic; few green grocers employ as many as ten workers.97  Yet 
this was the best that the agency could do with respect to direct employee representation, 
for employers fought vehemently against any such provision even while submitting to 
outside third-party monitoring of their wage and hour practices.  
According to Deputy AG Patricia Smith, who spearheads the program for the state, 
monitors have found significantly improved rates of compliance with wage and hour 
regulations.  Nearly every business inspected thus far has been found in substantial 
compliance.  Some technical and recordkeeping violations remain common in these small 
businesses, and monitors are educating employers as well as monitoring compliance.  But 
the improvement is dramatic.98
96
 See Bodie, Smith Interview, supra note --, at --.
97
 Communication with Patricia Smith, ---, on file with author.
98
 That is, they had paid workers at least the minimum wage plus one-and-a-half times the minimum 
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These experiments still occupy only a very small part of the larger scheme of labor 
standards regulation in the US.  Yet the decline of “command-and-control” and the rise of 
employer self-regulation – more or less well monitored and enforced – seems inexorable.  
It converges with the development and legal encouragement of “corporate compliance” 
programs across a range of regulatory arenas, as best exemplified by the the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines’ promise of mitigation of criminal sentencing for firms with 
effective internal preventive programs.99  The rise of self-regulation is also in keeping 
with regulatory trends, both in theory and in practice, across many areas of regulation and 
many countries across the globe.100  And it parallels emerging efforts to gain regulatory 
traction over manufacturing workplaces outside the developed world, where a growing 
share of the world’s goods are produced.101
In all of these settings, there is much skepticism from organized labor and worker 
advocates about the efficacy of corporate codes of conduct, private monitoring, and other 
forms of self-regulation.102  And there is too little research that rigorously evaluates the 
wage for hours beyond 40.  Because of how the overtime laws compute hourly wages and overtime 
premium, this leaves many employers in technical violation of the laws.  But the substantial compliance 
achieved thus far is a vast improvement over the rampant violations discovered initially.  Id. 
99
 Under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, a firm is eligible for mitigation of sanctions if an offense 
occurred despite "an effective program to prevent and detect violations of the law," provided the firm 
promptly reported violations once they occurred.  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 8, 393-433, § 
8C2.5(f) (1993).  These federal guidelines spurred the growth of corporate compliance programs.  For a 
generally favorable assessment of this approach to controlling corporate crime, see Jennifer Arlen & 
Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 745-52 (1997).  For a skeptical assessment based on the lack of empirical evidence of 
the efficacy of these regimes, see Krawiec, supra note --.
100
 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 28 (Cambridge U. Press 
2000):  “The last two decades of the twentieth century saw the rise of a ‘new regulatory state,’ where states 
do not so much run things as regulate them or monitor self-regulation.  Self-regulatory organizations 
frequently become more important than states in the epistemic communities where debates over regulatory 
design are framed.”  See also Robert Kagan & Lee Axelrad, Regulatory Encounters: Multinational 
Corporations and American Adversarial Legalism (2000).
101
 See Mark Barenberg, Law and Labor in the New Global Economy: Through The Lens of United 
States Federalism, 33 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 445 (1995).  For a critical assessment of the “code of 
conduct” approach to global labor regulation, see Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and 
the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 
401 (2001).
102
 See, e.g.., Harry W. Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global Economy: 
Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation, in Joanne Conaghan et al, Labour 
Law in an Era of Globalisation (forthcoming Oxford University Press, 2001); Adelle Blackett, Global 
Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate 
Conduct, 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 401 (2001).  Blackett, in particular, criticizes the “code of conduct” 
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efficacy of the internal compliance regimes that are gaining legal recognition.103  But a 
preference by many employee advocates for stronger adversarial enforcement is tempered 
by a growing realization that workplaces are too numerous and too varied, and production 
is too mobile and too global, to hope for traditional regulatory methods to do the whole 
job.  There will simply never be enough inspectors.  The question is no longer whether to 
invest in self-regulatory mechanisms but how to make those mechanisms effective in 
improving labor standards.  
IV.  Building a Framework for Effective Self-Regulation in the Workplace 
So we find that employment law – both the rights side and the regulatory side – is 
moving in the direction of allowing employers to “self-regulate,” and to partially 
substitute internal enforcement procedures for public enforcement.  Superficially these 
developments may appear to be a slow-motion and low-visibility replication of the New 
Deal embrace of self-governance over public regulation as the primary mode of 
protecting workers and improving their wages and working conditions.  We are once 
again moving toward internal “lawmaking” and “law enforcement” – albeit within a 
public law framework – and away from direct public regulation or judicial resolution of 
workplace disputes.  One obvious difference is that, this time around, workers have been 
largely cut out of the internal governance scheme.
So it is at least ironic and ultimately troubling that the trend toward self-regulation is 
taking hold at the same time that the system of self-governance through collective 
representation and bargaining is so diminished, and still diminishing, in scope.  The 
“self” that is increasingly claiming the prerogative to regulate itself is less likely than 
ever to encompass employees other than as individuals, who face familiar and daunting 
impediments to effective bargaining or intervention on their own behalf.  To see why this 
is problematic and to lay the groundwork for an effective response, let us reexamine these 
recent developments toward self-regulation through a more theoretical lens.  
approach for often lacking both an external regulatory dimension and an independent monitoring system, 
two features that I also insist are crucial.  Id. at 411-12.
103
 See Krawiec, supra note --.
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A. “Responsive Regulation” and Tripartism
Among the analytical frameworks that have been put forward to illuminate and shape 
the megatrend toward self-regulation, that of “Responsive Regulation,” elucidated by 
Professors Ayres and Braithwaite, is particularly well suited to the problem of labor 
regulation.104  A basic problem for regulators is the range and complexity of human 
motivations among regulated actors.  In short, there are both “good guys” and “bad guys” 
among the regulated, and there are many who could go either way depending partly on 
the workings of the regulatory scheme.  This is true within industries – some firms aim to 
be model corporate citizens while others are self-interested maximizers who will defect 
whenever it profits them – as well as within firms – some individuals are more committed 
to doing the right thing than others.  It is true even within individuals, whose consciences 
may speak to them in more than one voice.  In other words, “preferences” or dispositions 
toward compliance with regulatory norms are both heterogeneous and endogenous; they 
are varied, and they can change in response to the regulatory environment.
This heterogeneity poses a challenge for regulators, particularly in a world of scarce 
enforcement resources.  A system of regulation that assumes that all regulated actors are 
self-interested opportunists who will respond only to carrots and sticks will waste 
enforcement resources on those who seek to do the right thing and squander the good will 
and the vast regulatory resources within those actors.  Yet a system that assumes instead 
that regulated actors are well-intentioned and seek to abide by the law – such as a system 
of wholesale self-regulation – invites the more opportunistic actors to cheat.  That puts 
competitive pressure on the would-be law-abiders, erodes trust and norms of good 
citizenship, and breeds resentment.  
The regulatory solution proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite is the establishment of a 
pyramid of enforcement mechanisms, from the least interventionist form of self-
regulation and self-reporting at the bottom of the pyramid to the most punitive sanctions 
– what they call “the benign big gun” – at the top.105  The choice of enforcement 
104
 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note --.
105
 The pyramid needs to escalate to very punitive sanctions, for the more onerous the highest penalty, 
the more pressure there is on regulatees to cooperate.  The pyramid should also contain many incremental 
steps, for a system with just a few regulatory approaches – e.g., one cooperative and one punitive – lacks 
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mechanism is based on the compliance record of the regulated entity, and is subject to 
change based on new experience:  Compliance is rewarded with more cooperative, less 
adversarial, and more firm-based enforcement strategies.  Non-compliance is met with 
the escalation of regulatory scrutiny and sanctions, coupled with a willingness either to 
escalate further to harshly coercive sanctions in response to chronic non-compliance or to 
return to cooperative strategies in response to improved compliance.106  At some risk of 
oversimplification, the scheme might be understood as comprising two tracks (each with 
its own gradations):  a cooperative and largely self-regulatory track and an adversarial 
enforcement track.107
A system that relies heavily on self-regulation and that encourages cooperation 
between regulators and regulated actors seeks to tap into a wealth of knowledge, 
experience, creativity, good will, and organizational efficacy within the firm.  If those 
resources can be brought to bear on the enforcement of legal norms, then scarce public 
regulatory resources can be targeted at “bad actors” and leveraged into more thorough 
accomplishment of the public’s regulatory aims.   But a system that encourages 
cooperation and self-regulation is also vulnerable both to cheating by reputedly-
compliant actors and to “capture” of the regulators, who may indulge a preference for 
cooperation when it is not warranted.  
Responsive Regulation seeks to guard against both cheating and capture by 
empowering third-party watchdogs that are independent of both regulators and the 
regulated and that represent the interests that the particular regulatory scheme seeks to 
advance.  It is a “tripartite” model of regulation.  In some regulatory regimes – for 
example, environmental regulation – this role must be played by a public interest group.  
In many cases, however, the public interest can be represented by the beneficiaries 
flexibility.  It risks locking actors into adversarial patterns, or allowing them to coast on an outdated record 
of cooperation, because a switch in regulatory modes appears too drastic.  See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra 
note --, at --.
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 Ayres and Braithwaite describe the appropriate regulatory strategy as a version of the “tit-for-tat” 
strategy that game theorists have found to produce a cooperative equilibrium among repeat players in 
“prisoners’ dilemma”-type games.  Id. at --.
107
 See Neil A. Gunningham, Towards Effective and Efficient Enforcement of Occupational Health and 
Safety Regulation: Two Paths to Enlightenment, 19 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 547, 552 (1998) (proposing a 
two-track – cooperative and adversarial – approach to regulation of workplace health and safety).
SELF-REGULATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE PAGE 39
themselves.  So, they suggest, “[t]he simplest arena to understand how tripartite 
regulation would work is with occupational health and safety,” in which a union and its 
“elected union health and safety representatives” would participate in inspections, receive 
information, and initiate enforcement.108  They suggest that “one could usefully grant the 
same rights to a nonunion safety representative elected at a nonunionized workplace,” 
provided that one could insure access to technical and legal assistance.  “Where there is 
no power base and no information base for the weaker party, tripartism will not work.”109
These are problems to which we will return.
Employee representatives can also participate directly within the self-regulatory 
process itself, helping to devise rules and standards, implement them, monitor 
compliance, take complaints, train employees, and the like.  Almost uniquely in the 
context of workplace regulation, the primary beneficiaries of the law are fully competent 
adults who operate inside of the regulated entity, and are potentially capable of speaking 
for themselves and playing a part in the internal regulatory regime.110  Workers are on the 
scene, well-informed about workplace conditions, and motivated to represent their own 
interests within the firm.  Within the internal self-regulatory regime, a union or other 
representative of employees functions not just as an independent third party but as an 
integral constituent of the “self” that is charged with self-regulation.  The employee 
organization can serve not only as a watchdog over the regulated entity and the regulatory 
agency, but as an integral participant in the internal processes by which regulatory 
standards are set and met or improved upon.  
The presence of employees inside the “self-regulating” firm might suggest that the 
problems to which tripartism responds do not exist in the case of workplace regulations.  
But that would be a mistake for two reasons.  First, while the interests advanced by labor 
standards laws are generally “local public goods” within the workforce, and are subject to 
familiar collective action problems.  That is most obviously true with regard to the 
108
 Ayres & Braithwaite, at 59.
109
 Id. at --.
110
 Ayres and Braithwaite speak of public interest groups (PIGs) being represented in independent 
internal inspection and compliance groups, and give as an example union representation on the workplace 
health and safety group.  A&B, p. 106.  See also p. 126.
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mitigation of health and safety hazards, but it is also true of wage and hour practices, 
leave policies, and equal employment policies.  As those phrases imply, such matters are 
typically dealt with by policies, not by individualized decisionmaking (much less 
negotiations); any one worker’s effort to bargain for better is encumbered by the 
expectation that any improvements may have to be extended to others as well.111  Second, 
individuals may face not only inadequate incentives to seek improved labor standards but 
also powerful disincentives in the form of feared reprisals.112  Collective representation 
can supplant the need for individual workers to step forward with complaints and can 
protect workers against unwarranted discipline or discharge.  
Unions fit the tripartite bill well, for they are designed to meet the challenges posed 
by both the “public goods” nature of workplace conditions and the problem of worker 
dependency and fear.  They have, through their members, information about working 
conditions on the ground, and they can represent members’ aggregate interest in 
improving them.  They almost invariably bring job security – protection against arbitrary 
discipline and discharge, and thus against reprisals – as part of their package of 
contractual benefits.  Whether an employee committee can serve these functions in the 
non-union setting remains an open question to which we will return.
Self-regulation as it is conceived in Responsive Regulation is not a substitute for 
public regulation.  It bears little resemblance to the bland invocations of “voluntary 
compliance” of some employer advocates and allies.  Rather, it embeds “self-regulation” 
in a system of external and internal accountability – external accountability to public 
regulators with the power to impose coercive sanctions and internal accountability to the 
workers whose interests are at issue.  And it situates self-regulation in a broader scheme 
in which traditional inspections, enforcement, and punitive sanctions continue to operate 
for the low-road or less-capable actors at the bottom of the labor market.  The next 
question is whether it is a viable model for workplace regulation in the US.
111
 On the public goods problem in labor standards enforcement, see generally Louise Sadowsky Brock, 
Overcoming Collective Action Problems: Enforcement of Worker Rights, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 781, 
789-92 (1997).
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 Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 
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B. Responsive Regulatory Theory Meets US Regulatory Reality:  The 
Enforcement Gap and the Representation Gap 
One encouraging point of divergence between the theory of Responsive Regulation 
and emerging regulatory reality is the moderately successful use of self-regulatory 
mechanisms not for the most cooperative and compliant regulated actors but for chronic 
“defectors.”  Within Responsive Regulation, regulatory “big guns” are aimed at chronic 
defectors, who are on a decidedly adversarial enforcement track; that threat indirectly 
helps to support effective self-regulation by well-intentioned and capable high-road 
actors who are on the cooperative self-regulatory track.  But the NY Attorney General’s 
Green Grocer Code and the DOL’s use of the “hot-goods” provision in the textile 
industry are two examples of what might be called the remedial use of self-regulatory 
mechanisms.  Both involved the direct deployment of legal coercion as leverage in 
securing submission to a decidedly regulated version of self-regulation; both have been 
reasonably successful.  That would suggest a possible expansion of what Responsive 
Regulation envisions as the domain of self-regulation.
In other respects, however, the application of Responsive Regulation to US labor 
regulation faces several hurdles:  Can Responsive Regulation work in an environment of 
chronic underinvestment in the enforcement of labor standards?  Can tripartism work in 
the overwhelmingly non-union American workplace, and in the face of the vehement 
anti-unionism of most American employers?  Or would an effort to apply Responsive 
Regulation to US reality founder on the shoals of underenforcement, union decline, and 
anti-union animus?  
1. Underenforcement
While Responsive Regulation aims to make more efficient use of scarce enforcement 
resources, it still demands greater regulatory oversight and resources than are – or are 
perhaps ever likely to be – available to a regulatory agency like OSHA.113  Successful 
examples of “responsive” occupational health and safety regulation are found in Australia 
and in the US Mine Health and Safety Administration, both of which maintain a much 
113
 On the chronic shortage of inspectors and resources, see McGarity & Shapiro, supra note --; Thomas 
O. McGarity, Reforming OSHA: Some Thoughts for the Current Legislative Agenda, 31 Hous.L.Rev. 99 
(1994).  
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higher density of inspections than does OSHA for the workplaces under its jurisdiction.  
One study calculated that, on average, OSHA officers inspect a workplace once every 
107 years.114  Similarly, public enforcement of wage and hour laws suffers from a chronic 
deficit that helps produce compliance rates of less than 50 percent in some low-wage 
industries.115
Moreover, both OSHA and the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division gravitate toward 
modest penalties that do not remotely offset the low probability of detection.  In the case 
of OSHA, criminal prosecution is rare and fines, civil and criminal, are modest.116  The 
agency has sometimes been frustrated in its episodic efforts to impose mega-fines that 
might serve as a real deterrent. 117  In the latter case, the hot-goods embargo provision 
qualifies as a “big gun,” and has proven a potent inducement to cooperation.  But its 
potential is confined to goods-production, and mainly to time-sensitive products such as 
fashion apparel and perishable goods (though in a just-in-time world, most products may 
be time-sensitive enough for these purposes).  More importantly, the embargo can be 
triggered only by the DOL, with its limited enforcement resources.  For many employers 
who are tempted to violate the law, the risk and cost of detection by public enforcement 
agencies is still too low to induce compliance when market conditions encourage 
defection.  
The low rate of enforcement defies one of the key prescriptions of Responsive 
Regulation:  The cost of non-cooperation or “defection,” primarily in the form of 
enforcement and sanctions, must be great enough to deter the most willful defectors and 
to protect cooperators against demoralizing and economically injurious competition from 
defectors.  That would require a massive infusion of regulatory resources into these 
programs (perhaps coupled with an upsurge of targeted private litigation, a distinctly 
114
 OSHA Inspection Cycle Equals 107 Years, Because of Low Resources, AFL-CIO Reports, 81 Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-7 (2000).
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 Weil at 12-13.
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 See Stacy Cooper, et al., Employment-Related Crimes, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 367, 378-79 (2003).  
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American “wild card” that regulatory theory, including Responsive Regulation, tends to 
neglect).  Absent a serious escalation in the commitment to enforcing and improving 
labor standards generally, an effort to apply Responsive Regulation might end up 
masking what amounts to a process of deregulation.  
Part of the solution must lie in the “targeting” of enforcement resources – in the 
redeployment of existing enforcement resources and scrutiny toward sectors and 
employers whose noncompliance is most chronic or serious.118  But how are regulators to 
identify targets without doing inspections?  Moreover, unless regulators’ sights are to 
remain permanently fixed on the targeted sectors, they need to come up with strategies to 
secure compliance that do not depend on intensive continuing oversight – something to 
leave behind as they move on to a different set of targets.  Those structures will need to 
draw on non-governmental regulatory resources, both from within and from outside the 
regulated firms.  Targeted enforcement must be used as leverage to induce firms to accept 
otherwise unacceptable conditions that aim to insure future compliance.  Targeting of the 
textile industry and the green grocer sector, for example, gave regulators the leverage to 
secure “voluntary” submission to self-regulation and monitoring.  
2. Non-Union Workplaces and Anti-Union Employers  
So one puzzle is how to drive and manage a system of effective self-regulation in a 
context of chronic underenforcement.  Another puzzle is how to adapt tripartism to 
predominantly non-union American workplaces.  In workplaces in which unions exist, 
their participation in self-regulatory schemes should be required (as indeed it is in the 
case of OSHA’s VPP).  Unfortunately, unions exist inside too few firms in the US to 
serve as the only vehicle of employee representation.  Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that 
non-union employee committees – the equivalent of limited-purpose works councils –
can step into the same role.  But that answer is problematic, especially in the American 
context, for several reasons.
118
 In principle, that is what OSHA promises.  See ---.  In practice, the opposite has traditionally been 
true:  inspections and enforcement actions are more likely in the larger and more visible establishments that 
tend to have better compliance than smaller and more marginal establishments.  See ---
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First, it is unclear whether non-union, workplace-based institutions of employee 
representation are able to perform their part in a tripartite scheme for workplace standards 
enforcement.  Employee committees that exist only inside firms – that have no outside 
power base or organizational structure – may be too vulnerable to capture or intimidation 
to serve as the chief guardians against both cheating by employers and capture of 
agencies.   In particular, where participating employees are terminable at will, as most 
non-union employees are, they may be too vulnerable to reprisals to play their assigned 
role even within a collective framework.  That is especially likely among immigrant 
workers – often undocumented immigrants – who occupy many of the worst workplaces, 
and who may fear not only discharge but deportation.119  That is not to say that these 
committees accomplish nothing.  There is some evidence that non-union health and 
safety committees improve compliance (though less than unions do).120  Such committees 
may help overcome some of the “public goods” problems of labor standards enforcement 
by aggregating the information, the energies, and the incentives of individual employees 
to engage in enforcement activity.  However, such committees lack independence from 
the employer and the expertise and power that an outside organizational base can 
supply.121
Part of what makes unions effective as watchdogs is an organizational existence 
beyond the particular workplace.  That gives them greater independence from the 
employer, insulation from reprisals, and expertise than any group of employees alone 
could have.  Unions exist both inside and outside the firm:  they supply regulatory eyes 
and impulses from the workers directly affected, as well as an independent perspective, 
expertise, and power base.  Of course, the existence of a union does not necessarily 
banish the fear of reprisals and of job loss that might dampen the pursuit of regulatory 
119 Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and 
the Need for Reform, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 345, 348 (2001); Marianne Staniunas, All Employees Are 
Equal, But Some Employees Are More Equal Than Others, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 393, 399-400 
(2004).
120 See supra note --.
121
 Indeed, unions might help supply such independence and expertise to employee committees, such as 
the health and safety committees that are mandatory in some states, even in workplaces in which they do 
not represent the majority of employees.  See Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the 
Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. Pa. 
J. Lab. & Emp. L. 75 (2002).
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objectives, even those that seek to benefit workers.  Still, an organizational existence 
outside as well as inside the workplace may be essential for an employee representative 
to serve as the third leg of a tripartite system of regulated self-regulation.  
Another problem with securing collective employee representation in non-union 
workplaces lies in the peculiar provisions of US labor law.  The NLRA defines any 
employee committee that deals with an employer on work-related matters as a “labor 
organization” – in effect, a union – and goes on to prohibit employers from dominating, 
interfering with, or supporting such organizations.122  Many forms of interaction between 
employee committees and employers that may seem innocuous to the uninitiated would 
violate that prohibition.  In effect, the NLRA rules out a range of intermediate options 
between purely individual bargaining and full-fledged union-like representation.  In one 
sense, the NLRA reflects the same concerns expressed above – that employees in a non-
union setting are too vulnerable to cooptation and intimidation.123  But it puts the force of 
federal law behind those concerns, and limits the range of potential experimentation with 
alternative forms of employee representation within a tripartite scheme for labor 
standards regulation.124  It demands employee representation that is scrupulously 
independent of the employer or else absent altogether.  
A third impediment to non-union forms of employee representation lies in the deep-
seated employer opposition to unions and, by extension, to any kind of real collective 
employee representation.125  Even if legal hurdles were surmounted and concerns about 
122
 See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §102(5) (defining “labor organization); §158(a)(2) (prohibiting employer 
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Drives, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 351, 351 (1990); Julius G. Getman, Explaining the Fall of the Labor 
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efficacy addressed, any proposal to mandate “works councils” or the like would be 
vehemently opposed by employers, who would see such an entity as a proto-union, the 
risks of which outweigh the benefits of a more cooperative and less adversarial 
enforcement regime.  (Ironically, some union adherents would see those same employee 
bodies as proto-company unions, and as posing risks of capture and cooptation that 
negate or outweigh the potential benefits of organized employee participation.)  
Similarly, if participation in a system of self-regulation were conditioned on the existence 
of a structured, elected, and independent “employee council” or committee, the system 
would have few takers among employers in non-union workplaces.  
The problem of deep-seated employer aversion to independent employee 
representation interacts with the problem of chronic underenforcement to frustrate the 
implementation of a genuinely tripartite scheme of labor regulation.  In that framework, a 
cooperative, firm-centered self-regulatory approach is to be both a reward for and an 
inducement to good behavior.  But the conditions for entry into the self-regulatory arena 
can be only as demanding as the rewards, tangible and intangible, of self-regulation; and 
the rewards of self-regulation depend partly on the weight of scrutiny and oversight under 
the traditional default regime.  For most US employers most of the time, the expected 
cost of adversarial enforcement is too low to justify taking the risk (of unionization) 
associated with formal employee representation.  Without a greater coercive threat, it will 
be difficult to induce most employers to take meaningful steps toward effective self-
regulation, and perhaps least of all steps toward employee representation.  
There is one further reason to seek alternatives to workplace-based union-like 
representation of employees:  This form of collective employee representation assumes a 
bounded workplace, a stable workforce, and a single employer.  Trends toward increasing 
use of temporary, contingent, and contract labor, toward electronic communications and 
transmission of work product, and toward shorter job tenure and thinner internal labor 
Movement, 41 St. Louis U. L.J. 575, 578–84 (1997); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: 
Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 59, 61–62 (1993); Paul Weiler, 
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 
1769, 1769–70 (1983).
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markets, defy those assumptions.126  The increasing contingency, volatility, and even 
virtuality of workplace relationships casts a shadow not only over traditional forms of 
union representation and collective bargaining but over proposals for “works councils” or 
other forms of collective self-governance within a workplace community.  Collective 
representation may be possible in a workplace shared by regular employees (many of 
short tenure), temporary employees, telecommuters, and the employees of independent 
contractors, suppliers, and customers; but it might look very different from a traditional 
union, which engages in exclusive collective bargaining within a fixed bargaining unit.  I 
will return to these possiblities in Parts V and VI.  
The proponents of Responsive Regulation make a very strong case that, where it is 
possible, full-blown tripartism – in which strong and independent labor organizations 
represent employees vis-à-vis both regulatory agencies and their employers – is the right 
aspiration for an effective system of self-regulation.  But it is a sufficiently elusive 
aspiration in the current political and labor relations climate in the US that we need to 
consider alternative mechanisms for making self-regulation work – alternatives that leave 
open the road, or even take a few steps down the road, toward true tripartism without 
depending on it. 
C. “Ratcheting Labor Standards” and the Role of Monitoring
In light of the problems of underenforcement and “underrepresentation,” it may be 
useful to consider models of regulation that rely less on intensive state engagement with 
regulated actors and less on independent union-like employee representation.  Therein 
lies much of the appeal of alternative frameworks such as what Charles Sabel and his 
collaborators call “Ratcheting Labor Standards” (RLS).  Like Responsive Regulation, 
RLS relies on the internal regulatory capacity of firms themselves and on third-party non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).  But RLS is a kind of post-regulatory regime that 
does not depend at all on the state to monitor, inspect, or sanction employers.  It was 
conceived as a way to improve labor standards and enforce international labor rights in 
126
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developing countries with little or no effective state regulatory capacity.127  RLS may also 
suggest ways to improve enforcement, even in the low-wage non-union workplace, in the 
face of chronically inadequate regulatory oversight.
1. Ratcheting Labor Standards:  Regulating Without States or Unions
The basic idea behind RLS is that the large transnational enterprises at the top of the 
manufacturing pyramid have enormous untapped enforcement capabilities with regard to 
their chain of suppliers, including those at the bottom-most rungs of the global production 
hierarchy; and that those capabilities can be tapped by creating mechanisms of 
transparency and exploiting these enterprises’ vulnerability to public and consumer 
pressure.  As with Responsive Regulation, the focal point of “regulatory” activity is 
within the firm itself, and specifically within transnational corporations themselves.  
Those corporations have, by necessity, developed effective ways to monitor and 
coordinate the activities of far-flung contractors and subcontractors.  They have done so 
in pursuit of the optimal tradeoff between quality and cost.  It is of course the cost side of 
that equation that tends to produce a “race-to-the-bottom” in labor standards.  But to the 
extent that improved labor standards go hand in hand with higher quality, greater agility, 
and ultimately productivity, the same competitive imperatives can help generate a “race-
to-the-top.”   
A crucial part of the equation, however, is consumer solidarity with workers and 
repugnance toward exploitative practices.  The transnational corporations have enormous 
investments in their brands, and are highly sensitive to consumer pressure and negative 
publicity, which can follow the exposure of exploitive labor practices among the 
corporations’ suppliers.  These pressures can induce the corporations to enter into “codes 
of conduct” that commit them to both (1) compliance with international and domestic 
labor rights and to additional improvements in labor standards beyond what either body 
of law mandates; and (2) submission to a system of outside monitoring.  A central 
element of RLS is transparency – that is, transmitting reliable information about labor 
practices and conditions from the bottom layers of the supply chain, located mostly in 
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remote, poor, developing nations with no effective regulatory apparatus, to the public and 
the customers of the multinational corporation in the developed world.  
So the crucial actors in RLS, apart from the multinational firms themselves, are non-
governmental monitoring organizations (which inspect and certify labor conditions, 
necessarily with the cooperation of firms), non-governmental advocacy groups (which 
publicize good and bad labor practices), and consumers (a critical mass of whom can be 
counted on to prefer brands associated with fair labor practices).  Together these actors 
can drive a “race to the top” – a competition in improved labor standards – among brand-
conscious multinational corporations.  The prodigious internal resources of the 
multinationals, together with the power of publicity and consumer pressure, largely 
supplant governmental oversight and compulsion in an economy that moves faster and 
reaches further than any government can.   
RLS explicitly engages the complexities of modern global manufacturing supply 
chains.  It seeks to harness the resources of the largest, most visible, and most competent 
(if not always civically virtuous) corporate actors not so much to regulate themselves as 
to regulate the less competent and less visible entities that supply them with most of the 
labor that goes into their products.  And it seeks to do so in the virtual absence of 
governmental power in the jurisdiction in which that labor is employed.  It is a scheme of 
“self-regulation” in which the “self” encompasses the entire network of firms that make 
up the supply chain in much of the manufacturing sector.  That redefinition allows for the 
expansion of self-regulation from the “good corporate citizens” (who qualify for self-
regulation under Responsive Regulation) to the near-outlaw firms at the bottom of the 
labor market.  The vulnerability of the scheme lies in the lack of coercive state authority 
– a “big gun” in RR terms – to reliably discipline the outlaws and opportunists, and in its 
dependence on the potentially fickle sympathies of comparatively rich consumers, many 
of whom may prefer to remain ignorant of the conditions under which their sneakers are 
produced.
The proponents of RLS put forth their scheme as an intelligent consolidation and 
extension of trends already in evidence among some highly visible multinationals.  But 
the scheme is not fully in place, and the verdict is not yet in as to how well and under 
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what conditions this scheme works.  Some monitoring arrangements that might wish to 
claim the imprimatur of RLS have been heavily criticized for succumbing to capture by 
the multinational firms themselves.128  Monitors may adopt inspection protocols that 
allow cheating to go undetected, and may indulge firms’ taste for secrecy, thus blocking 
the crucial flow of information to advocates and consumers.  
Of course, where there is no viable regulatory alternative – no state apparatus with 
effective enforcement capacity – RLS-like systems may not have to work very well to be 
worth supporting.129  But where there is a reasonably competent regulatory regime – as is 
the case within the US – it may not make sense to sidestep it altogether in favor of a 
private monitoring regime.  Agencies like OSHA and the Labor Department’s Wage and 
Hour Division are usually capable, when they set their sights on an employer, of 
undertaking investigations, imposing sanctions, and enforcing judgments.  The problem 
within the US is one of underenforcement – inadequate density of enforcement activity 
and sometimes inadequate remedial or punitive tools.   (Of course, another problem 
within the US is that production doesn’t necessarily take place, or stay, within the US.  
Something like RLS at a global level may be necessary for the support of US labor 
standards even if we had a fully-resourced and “responsive” domestic regime.)  The 
question becomes whether RLS can teach lessons in how to improve labor standards in 
the US context of underenforcement and “underrepresentation.”
2. Responsive Regulation and RLS:  Points of Convergence and Divergence
There are many points of convergence between Responsive Regulation and RLS.  
Both recognize and seek to mobilize the vast regulatory resources that lie within the 
modern firm.  Both diverge from the “command” feature of “command-and-control,” 
adopting instead a quasi-contractual approach to regulation:  Firms agree, under certain 
constraints, to submit to self-regulatory protocols.  Both represent efforts to make “self-
regulation” effective, in part by designating non-governmental actors to play crucial roles 
safeguarding the interests of workers and the public.  Both also seek to economize on the 
128
 See Blackett, supra note --.
129
 On the other hand, RLS might be strengthened by a commitment to working with and strengthening 
local enforcement capacity, see Barenberg, ---, and a commitment to enforcing workers’ rights of self-
organization and to incorporating workers’ voices into the scheme.  See id. at ---; Blackett, supra note --.
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traditional resort to governmental oversight and coercion by bringing other actors into the 
equation.  
The two models diverge on other points.  Most importantly, government coercion –
rarely used but always on call – plays a pivotal role in Responsive Regulation, while it is 
absent altogether from RLS.130  Pragmatists on both sides would recognize that 
governmental powers and institutions, where they exist, can be brought into the RLS 
equation in helpful ways, while NGOs might help to fill the partial regulatory vacuum 
that frustrates the full implementation of Responsive Regulation in the US.  We might 
therefore adopt a hybrid approach in which the role of outside, non-governmental actors 
expands to the extent that the role and efficacy of government diminishes.  
Another point of divergence between the two models is with respect to the identity 
and role of the non-governmental actors.  Responsive Regulation is a full-fledged 
tripartite regime; it insists on empowering representatives of the primary regulatory 
beneficiaries, particularly when those beneficiaries are situated within the regulated 
organization.  Responsive Regulation seeks to tap into both the self-interest of those 
beneficiaries and their intimate knowledge of conditions inside the organization.  It 
would rely on outside entities, with their more diffuse constituencies and altruistic 
motivations, only when the beneficiaries of regulation cannot speak and act for 
themselves (as in the case of environmental regulations).  The proponents of RLS are 
rather more hazy and less insistent about the role of the workers themselves and their 
organizations.131  Trade unions figure among possible advocates of RLS, monitors and 
proponents of improvement, and beneficiaries of its regime of transparency.  But the 
workers whose working conditions are at stake play no real role in the scheme. 132
130 The private, non-state-centered approach to international rights enforcement is both a strength and a 
weakness.  See Paul Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting 
and Compliance, 37 Int'l Law. 69 (2003). 
131
 See Sabel, et al., supra note –, at --.    
132 Adelle Blackett is critical of many corporate codes of conduct in the global manufacturing context 
for their neglect of worker representation; she seeks to inject a broadened conception of “tripartism-plus” to 
include representation by NGOs.  See Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the 
Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 401, 
436-40 (2001).
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The absence of worker involvement is a weakness of RLS, but it may be simply 
realistic in the context of developing countries with little or no governmental enforcement 
capacity and no real protection for workers’ ability to organize and speak for themselves.  
The freedom of association among workers is in fact one of the international labor rights 
that is most systematically and harshly suppressed in parts of the world in which the most 
labor-intensive phases of manufacturing are increasingly performed.  The vulnerability 
and dependence of the workers themselves may justify the turn in RLS to outside NGOs, 
which have the considerable advantages of both independence and the ear of wealthy 
consumers.  Of course, outside groups are at a disadvantage, relative to the workers 
themselves, with respect to knowledge about working conditions.  So RLS relies on both 
advocacy organizations (who can supply independence and economic leverage) and 
monitoring organizations (who inspect workplaces and supply information to advocacy 
groups and consumers) to perform the functions that Responsive Regulation assigns to 
employees’ own organizations.
The US presents an intermediate case between the comprehensive but misdirected 
regulatory environment that Responsive Regulation seeks to reconfigure and the 
regulatory wilderness that RLS seeks to tame.  A usable hybrid model for the US should 
take into account both the reasonably competent but undersized public agencies at issue 
and the formally-established but underenforced freedom of workers to join together and 
act in support of shared interests.  
3. The Multiple Uses of Monitoring
The deployment of independent outside monitors in particular is a vital innovation 
that may help to supply some of the independence and expertise that unions supply within 
Responsive Regulation’s tripartism but that are missing from the non-union and anti-
union workplaces that predominate within the US.  While collective employee 
representation is essential to a full-fledged tripartite system of monitored self-regulation, 
monitoring itself, even without direct collective employee representation, can help 
liberate employee voice, individual and collective.  It “triangulates” tripartism, advancing 
not directly along the path toward collective representation, but perhaps diagonally in the 
right direction by helping to liberate individual employee voice and to give voice to 
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outside worker advocates.  Monitoring may thus enhance the prospects for employee 
representation and tripartism for in the future.  
Take, for example, the Green Grocer Code, which largely lacks mechanisms for 
direct employee representation but which may nonetheless take a step toward employee 
empowerment.  Employers under the GGCC submit to unannounced inspections by 
monitors who are themselves overseen by and accountable to employee advocacy 
organizations, as well as the AG.  These independent monitors multiply regulatory eyes 
within the workplace and help to give voice to individual employees.  Private meetings 
between monitors and employees, with formal assurances of non-retaliation and a open 
channel of communication between employees and monitors, may go some distance 
toward quelling the employee fear that corrodes any system of workplace rights.  
Workers are afforded, though not a collective voice, at least a chance of exercising their 
individual voices.  And at least insofar as the monitors themselves can judge, workers 
interviewed pursuant to the GGCC do appear to feel free to speak to them about 
employer practices.133
Monitoring works in some rather diffuse ways to advance workers’ freedom of 
association and expression.  For the presence of outside monitors cracks open the doors 
of the workplace to a degree of public or quasi-public scrutiny beyond what rare and 
tightly regulated public inspections could do; they demonstrate tangibly to employees 
that their rights matter and that someone is watching out for them.  An employer’s 
agreement to submit to monitoring represents the negotiated surrender of part of the 
sovereignty that employers still claim over the workplace.  As it did before the New Deal, 
employer sovereignty over the physical workplace presents no small challenge not only 
to the regulation of working conditions but to competing principles of democracy and 
freedom of association within the workplace.134  Breaching employer sovereignty by the 
introduction of third parties – parties accountable to the public interest and independent 
of the employer – can advance those competing principles at least indirectly.  
133
 Communication w/ Patricia Smith, Associate Attorney General of New York, Labor Division 
(7/13/04).
134
 The contest between property rights and labor rights has been a persistent theme under the NLRA, 
most recently and overtly in the battle over union organizer access to employer property.  See Cynthia 
Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 305 (1994).  
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Monitoring also works in more concrete ways, in part by formalizing and protecting 
employee “whistleblowing.”  Effective outside monitoring both depends on and helps to 
promote employees’ ability to speak up for themselves without fear of reprisals.  If a 
system of outside monitoring contains effective assurances of non-retaliation for 
individual employees who speak up – and it must do so to work at all – then it may help 
to lay the groundwork for employees to speak to each other as well and to associate for 
other shared workplace goals.  If outside monitoring helps to alleviate the corrosive 
problem of employee fear, it may represent a step toward the liberation of employee 
voice more generally.
D. Refining Monitored Self-Regulation:  A Sarbanes-Oxley for the Workplace?
The importance of employee “whistleblowers” and of monitor independence and 
accountability in a monitoring regime suggest yet a third source of insights:  theories and 
institutions that seek to insure corporate integrity and accountability.  The twentieth 
century model for avoiding corporate misconduct and fraud couples a mandatory regime 
of disclosure with what we can fairly call a system of monitored self-regulation.135
Recent corporate scandals dealt a blow to the proponents of self-regulation, but the most 
tangible legal response to those scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, relies less on new 
forms of regulatory oversight than on new ways of shoring up self-regulation:  the law 
seeks to insure the independence and public accountability of the outside monitors or 
auditors, and to formalize and protect employee “whistleblowing.”136
The problems that have come to light in recent corporate scandals are analogous to 
the problem of widespread disregard of labor standards:  The pressure to maximize 
profits (or apparent returns) generates a tremendous temptation on the part of managers to 
cut corners and to disregard the constraints of external law.  Knowledge of legal 
135
 For one criticism of the reliance on self-regulation, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side 
of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275 (2002).   William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, 
Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1861, 1892-
98 (1995).  For a more favorable view, see Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate 
Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes Of Conduct, 78 Geo. L.J. 1559, 1647 
(1990) (exploring history and advocating expanded us of corporate codes and self-governance mechanisms
136
 On the centrality of these outside monitors or “gatekeepers” in guarding against corporate 
misconduct, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301 (2004).  
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transgressions is mostly confined to insiders within complex organizations and is hidden 
from public view and public enforcement.  And the individual employees who do have 
that knowledge – who might be moved to expose the illegal conduct – are often 
economically dependent on the transgressors at the top of the organization and vulnerable 
to reprisals.  Of course, at that level of generality, the problem is simply that of 
organizational compliance with law generally – the very problem with which the theory 
of Responsive Regulation grapples.  But the traditional system of safeguards against to 
corporate self-dealing, and recent legislative efforts to strengthen that system, highlight 
some essential elements and lend them a here-and-now political resonance that both 
Responsive Regulation and Ratcheting Labor Standards may lack.  
In the corporate governance context, the traditional solution to the problem of hidden 
corporate self-dealing has been thought to lie chiefly in the mandated deployment of 
independent, publicly licensed auditors – themselves subject to a system of professional 
self-regulation – who must certify the firm’s compliance with relevant standards of 
accounting and disclosure.  Sarbanes-Oxley sought to fortify that system of outside 
auditing (or monitoring) and to combat the capture of auditors by imposing measures 
designed to insure the professional independence of the auditors from the regulated firms, 
by strengthening the self-regulatory oversight of auditors, and by imposing new liabilities 
on those auditors.137  At the same time, legislators sought to tap into the enormous 
regulatory potential that resided within corporations themselves by encouraging 
employees to disclose wrongdoing.  To that end, the law prohibited reprisals against 
employee whistleblowers, and backed that prohibition with both criminal sanctions and a 
137
 So Sarbanes-0xley (1) prohibited auditors from engaging in certain other lucrative forms of business 
with corporate clients; (2) created a new "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board" to oversee public 
accountants; and (3) imposed new liabilities on auditors.  For a summary of major provisions, see John C. 
Coffee, Jr., A Brief Tour of the Major Reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ALI-ABA Continuing Legal 
Education, December 5, 2002.  Whether these new measures will restore the crucial regulatory role of these 
“gatekeepers” is questionable in light of hurdles to private enforcement of the securities laws that in the 
past may have supplied the primary deterrence to gatekeeper misconduct or negligence.  See Coffee, supra 
note --, at --.  
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private right of action with the full panoply of tort and equitable remedies:  compensatory 
damages, backpay, reinstatement, attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs.138
Sarbanes-Oxley thus fortifies an existing system of monitored (and regulated) self-
regulation by combating the capture of monitors and by protecting and institutionalizing 
employee whistleblowing – that is, by ensuring the independence and accountability of 
the outsiders looking in and by encouraging insiders to speak out.  With the backdrop of 
billions of dollars lost by shareholders and pocketed by insiders, Congress backed up 
these measures with beefed up criminal and civil penalties – “big guns,” indeed –
administered by the SEC.  But much as in the labor standards context, the mismatch 
between agency resources and the number and complexity of the regulated actors insures 
that the SEC and public prosecutors can play only the most episodic role in enforcement.  
While even an occasional criminal prosecution of a top executive can pack a surprising 
deterrent punch, “enforcement” is assumed to come primarily from private securities 
litigation.139
These lessons are directly relevant to the development of an effective system of 
monitored self-regulation of workplace rights and standards.  I have emphasized the 
importance of outside independent monitoring; but Sarbanes-Oxley counsels the adoption 
of specific safeguards against the capture of monitors by the monitored firm – such as 
certification and selection by a tripartite oversight group, use of approved inspection 
protocols, and conflict-of-interest prohibitions.  I have also underscored the importance 
of employee voice – ideally the independent collective representation required by full-
fledged tripartism, but at least the vigorous encouragement and protection of individual 
employees who speak up about rights and regulatory infractions.  That translates into 
both confidential communications between monitors and employees and the vigorous 
protection of whistleblower.  Sarbanes-Oxley represents the gold standard in protection 
138
 The criminal prohibition is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514 A; civil enforcement provisions appear in 
Section 806(b) of the Act.  
139
 Hence one potent criticism of the resulting scheme:  Hurdles to private enforcement of securities 
laws that were imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") and Supreme 
Court decisions (and not dismantled by Sarbanes-0xley) weaken the most important “stick” that deterred 
both corporate insiders and gatekeepers from engaging in or tolerating abuse.  See Coffee, supra note --, at -
-.   
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of employee whistleblowers, with both criminal sanctions and fully compensatory private 
civil remedies against reprisals.  Given the limited resources of public agencies, at least in 
the labor context, the Sarbanes-Oxley model of private rights of action for whistleblowers 
is especially worthy of emulation.  Therein also lies the third lesson to be taken from the 
model of securities regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley:  Private litigation can supply some of 
the enforcement energy and motivation that is supposed to emanate from the state in
Responsive Regulation and that is seemingly missing from RLS.  
E. A Hybrid Model of Monitored Self-Regulation 
Drawing on the theory and practice reviewed above, and considering the constraints 
of limited public enforcement and limited collective representation of employees, I 
propose a hybrid model of effective self-regulation in the workplace.  The Responsive 
Regulatory model supplies the fundamental notion of encouraging self-regulation, and 
tapping into the pro-compliance capabilities and impulses within the firm, largely through 
a combination of inducements and threats, while conditioning the privilege of self-
regulation on the presence of safeguards against cheating by firms and capture of 
regulators.  Also drawn from Responsive Regulation are the utility of state scrutiny and 
coercive sanctions, episodic though they may be; the concept of multiple regulatory 
tracks; and the aspiration to tripartism – to giving an institutionalized voice to the 
workers whose interests are most immediately at stake.  
RLS teaches the crucial lesson that regulation is possible without state regulators 
(and therefore with only episodic interventions by state regulators).  For our hybrid 
model, RLS supplies the basic framework of “codes of conduct” – quasi-contractual 
commitments that include but frequently go beyond the requirements of public law; the 
crucial innovation of independent monitoring as a partial substitute for state enforcement; 
the recruitment, at least in the non-union setting, of other external actors such as 
independent worker advocacy organizations to supply rewards and sanctions and to 
transmit information; the leveraging of regulatory resources within larger and more 
advanced firms to reach the smaller, less visible, and less competent firms that supply 
them with goods and labor; and the ambition of reaching the worst performing 
workplaces with this innovative constellation of actors.  
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Finally, from the recent response to corporate scandals, and scholarly and legislative 
assessments of the strengths and vulnerabilities of a system of monitored self-regulation, 
I draw three elements:  the need for close attention to the prerequisites for vigorous and 
independent monitoring (or auditing); the strong and privately-enforceable protection of 
employee whistleblowers against reprisals; and the value of private litigation on behalf of 
victims of misconduct as a supplemental form of enforcement and deterrence where 
public regulators are unable (or unwilling) to enforce the law.  
The net result is a hybrid model that uses targeted public enforcement and private 
litigation to back up, and to induce entry into, a system of monitored, quasi-tripartite self-
regulation.  That requires the following elements:
(1) A voluntary system of monitored self-regulation in which employers agree 
(or, where circumstances permit, agree to require their contractors or 
suppliers140): 
a. to comply with a code of conduct that incorporates (but potentially 
supplements) legal rights and standards, and 
b. to submit to monitoring of code compliance by entities that 
i. are independent of the employer and accountable to workers and 
the public, and 
ii. follow inspection protocols and standards of good practice that 
include confidential communication with employees as well as 
monitoring of employer records; 
(2) Targeted public enforcement, with the threat of potent sanctions, against the 
worst lawbreakers, along with the willingness to hold sanctions in abeyance 
for those who submit to a system of self-regulation under (1);
(3) Private rights of action on behalf of employees whose rights are violated, 
including whistleblowers, subject to a partial defense (especially against 
supercompensatory remedies) based on participation in self-regulation under 
(1);
140
 Under existing FLSA law, for example, that would be where either (1) the target employer could be 
held liable as a joint employer of the contractor’s employees, see supra note --; or (2) the contractors 
produce goods in violation of the FLSA (e.g., by paying sub-minimum wages) that can be subjected to the 
“hot goods” embargo to the detriment of the target employer.  
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Monitoring arrangements might be adopted voluntarily by firms seeking a prospective 
partial shield against targeted prosecution, criminal liability, excess fines, or punitive 
damages; or they might be negotiated between public or private enforcers and targeted 
violators as the condition for escaping potent and potentially ruinous sanctions.  Monitors 
would have to distinguish cheating by self-regulators from good faith violations, and 
would have to help public agencies and judges make the same distinction; for the former 
but not the latter would be grounds for losing the partial shield against public or private 
enforcement.
A good moniker for this hybrid is essential, and “monitored quasi-tripartite self-
regulation” is not it.  Let us call this model “monitored self-regulation,” in light of the 
pivotal role of monitoring and the enlarged “self” that is implied by the incorporation of 
employees’ own voices.  
V. Monitored Self-Regulation of Labor Standards:  Assessing Existing 
Experiments and Future Possibilities
Among the experiments with self-regulation in the US that we have discussed, none 
fully meets the prescriptions of “monitored self-regulation” (or of Responsive Regulation 
or RLS).  But a quick look back at three of these programs may help to give further 
definition to both the vulnerabilities and the possibilities of self-regulation within the US 
context.  I will follow this with a glance into the future and the prospects for a fuller 
realization of the promise of monitored self-regulation.
A. A Critical Look at Self-Regulatory Experiments Within the US 
OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Program:  The VPP tracks the basic outlines of 
Responsive Regulation in some respects.  It is a cooperative program designed to induce 
high performers to undertake much of the regulatory work; the inducement takes the form 
of foregoing some traditional adversarial processes – for example, unannounced 
inspections – in exchange for employers’ documented commitment to improved 
workplace safety.  
The VPP is also nominally “tripartite” in explicitly requiring employee involvement.  
Employers who wish to participate in the VPP must show that employees support 
participation, and that employees are “involved” in the enforcement process.  Where a 
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union is in place, it must support the employer’s application, and must participate in the 
VPP application process and in the self-regulatory program itself.  But in the non-union 
workplace, the requirements of employee support and involvement can be met through 
individual employee participation.  The regulations specify that “[e]mployees must be 
involved” in the employer’s safety and health program “in at least three meaningful, 
constructive ways in addition to their right to report a hazard.”  This requirement can be 
met through individuals’ participation, for example, in “audits, accident/incident 
investigations, self-inspections, suggestion programs, planning, training, [or] job hazard 
analysis.”141  These forms of employee involvement do not address the public goods 
problem associated with workers’ interest in safety, and provide no on-site collective 
support, power, or expertise to back up individual workers where they may be at odds 
with management.  In short, the VPP’s conception of “employee involvement” falls short 
of the “employee representation” called for by a genuine tripartism.  
To be sure, one optional avenue for “meaningful, constructive” employee 
involvement in the non-union workplace is through “appropriate safety and health 
committees and teams.”  The VPP’s very tentative embrace of safety and health 
committees reflects in part the hurdles that current labor law poses to non-union forms of 
employee representation.  But that is not the whole story, for the VPP could have 
mandated the kind of scrupulously independent employee committees that the NLRA 
permits.  That it does not do so may have more to do with employer opposition to 
independent employee representation than with the legal gauntlet created by the NLRA.  
Closer to the mark were the health and safety committees that would have been mandated 
by Clinton-era OSHA reform legislation.  But employer opposition to the prospect of 
independent employee representation (as well as union skepticism about the possibility of 
independent employee representation in a non-union setting) contributed to the demise of 
that reform proposal. 
Still, the hybrid “monitored self-regulation” approach suggests that the impasse 
might be unsettled if not broken, and the VPP could be improved, by the introduction of 
141
 As for employee support, an employer’s claim of “employee support” in a non-union workplace is to 
be verified mainly by consultation with individual employees during the on-site evaluation of the program.    
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outside monitoring, at least in the non-union workplace.142  An outside monitoring body 
with health and safety expertise that is independent of the company and accountable in 
part to organizations that represent workers (that is, unions, state or local labor 
federations, or other bona fide worker advocacy organizations) would inject aspects of 
tripartism that are otherwise missing from the program as it operates in the non-union 
workplace.  Even in state programs that do mandate health and safety committees, there 
is enough doubt about the independence and capabilities of employees in the non-union 
setting to militate for the reinforcement that could be provided by independent 
monitoring organizations.143
Such a program – as long as it is voluntary – may be unlikely to attract employer 
participation absent some stepping up of enforcement pressure and of sanctions.  That 
problem points to the basic weaknesses of OSHA:  The low background threat of public 
enforcement, together with the lack of private enforcement mechansims, even on behalf 
of whistleblowers.  Absent serious reforms to federal OSHA, the prospects for successful 
experiments in monitored self-regulation of occupational health and safety may be 
confined to those states that have their own more ambitious programs.
The “Hot Goods” Textile Program:  The Department of Labor’s textile program 
contains some elements of a hybrid “monitored self-regulation” approach.  The program 
relies on the government’s wielding a “big gun” to motivate larger and more visible firms 
to take the lead in monitoring the smaller and less visible firms that supply them, and that 
are especially likely to be flouting labor standards.  Missing from the textile program, 
however, is any form of employee participation, either within the monitored firms 
themselves or within the monitoring organizations.  Nor do there appear to be any clear 
requirements governing the independence, expertise, public accountability, or inspection 
protocols of outside monitors.  In short, there appear to be few safeguards against the 
capture or cooptation of monitors by employers.  
142
 For another proposal to incorporate third-party monitoring into a system of self-regulation of health 
and safety, see Neil A. Gunningham, Towards Effective and Efficient Enforcement of Occupational Health 
and Safety Regulation: Two Paths to Enlightenment, 19 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J 547 (1998).
143
 Doubt about the legality of such committees under the NLRA have been at least provisionally 
resolved.  See NLRA General Counsel’s Advice Memorandum on legality of state-mandated safety 
committees.
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The program’s modest success even without these safeguards should count as 
evidence in support of the potential of monitored self-regulation.  However, our foray 
into regulatory theory gives reason to believe that the program could be improved by the 
involvement of worker representatives in monitoring compliance, and by stricter 
regulation of outside monitors to insure their independence and accountability to the 
public.  Such independence and accountability, and a modicum of labor involvement, 
might be secured through a tripartite oversight mechanism:  The monitors themselves 
might be overseen by organizations that include employee or union representation.  That 
would keep alive the aspiration toward tripartism, and secure some of its regulatory 
benefits, in a non-union and notoriously low-wage sector.
The Green Grocer Code of Conduct:  Some of these additional elements are found in 
the Green Grocer program, which comes closest to the model hybrid approach.  The 
scheme gains most of its motivating force from the threat of state enforcement.  The 
threat of costly prosecution of past violations got the scheme off the ground, and the 
threat of enforcement on a going-forward basis appears to be a driving force behind 
compliance.  The Code also makes important use of outside monitoring, and seeks to 
recruit consumers into the regulatory scheme by publicly certifying participation.  
The Green Grocer Code also tips its hat to tripartism by recognizing the importance 
of employee representation.  Employee representatives from outside the green grocer 
sector – specifically, advocacy organizations representing workers’ interests – do play a 
role in Code enforcement.  This role is a direct growth of the instrumental role that these 
organizations played in the initial investigations and campaign for enforcement.  
Individual employees have a role as well, for they are guaranteed the opportunity to meet 
privately with monitors during unannounced inspections, and are offered assurances 
against retaliation.  Recall, however, that collective employee representation within the 
regulated businesses is recognized only symbolically.  Because of the adamant opposition 
of employers to the notion of employee representation, it is only in the few green 
groceries with more than ten employees that the GGCC calls for the appointment of 
employee spokespersons in connection with monitoring of pay practices.  Even while 
agreeing to allow independent third party monitors to enter their businesses, inspect 
records, and meet privately with individual employees, these employers balked at the 
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most rudimentary form of collective representation of and by their own employees.  
The dual problems of underenforcement and employer resistance to employee 
representation clearly impede efforts to develop effective self-regulatory measures.  Still, 
the Green Grocer Code may point in a fruitful direction.  Its apparent success in 
improving compliance suggests that monitored self-regulation can be a useful regulatory 
strategy for dealing with employers who reside at the grim end of the spectrum from 
consummate compliance to chronic defection.  It also suggests that, given the practical 
and legal difficulties of securing genuinely independent employee representation in the 
non-union context, and especially in low-wage, low-visibility workplaces, a tripartite 
structure for this sector may look quite different from its initial theoretical depiction.  The 
third leg of tripartism may need to be cobbled together out of a combination of individual 
employees and other non-governmental actors – such as the advocacy and monitoring 
organizations that populate the RLS landscape and that play a role in the Green Grocer 
Code.  The latter can supply some of the independence and expertise that employees 
themselves lack in these workplaces.  The resulting constellation of internal and external 
actors may together be able to serve most of the functions that unions ideally serve within 
a fully tripartite regime.  
The modest successes of the DOL’s program for wage and hour enforcement in the 
textile industry and the Green Grocer Code suggest, as Responsive Regulation would 
predict, that “big guns” are crucial to effective enforcement of labor standards in the low-
wage sector.  In the former case, the threatened use of the regulatory “big gun” of the 
goods embargo induces manufacturers to deploy the economic “big gun” of withholding 
business from non-compliant contractors.  Directly or indirectly, both schemes illustrate 
how regulators, when they do aim their “big guns” at noncompliant employers, can 
induce them to opt for cooperation over defection, and for regulated self-regulation over 
traditional coercive sanctions, even if that requires acceptance of conditions (such as 
monitoring) that they might otherwise seek to avoid.  One of those conditions should be 
employee involvement and empowerment.  
SELF-REGULATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE PAGE 64
B. The Next Step:  The “Representation Remedy”
Both the “hot goods”-textile program and Green Grocer programs show the way 
toward incorporating both monitoring and employee representation into prospective 
remedies for violation of labor standards.  Once chronic defectors have been identified 
and brought within the grip of regulators, they might be induced to accept a 
“representation remedy” as the price of continued operation.  Enforcement agencies could 
supervise election of representatives, and place the representatives under the protection of 
the agency and of outside monitors.  
The primary logic of the “representation remedy” would be prophylactic:  Employee 
representatives, with a protected line of communication with both outside monitors and 
regulators, would multiply regulatory eyes within the workplaces most in need of 
scrutiny.  The “representation remedy” would help focus regulatory attention on the 
workplaces that are most evidently in need of it and, in particular, most in need of the 
benefits that collective employee voice can bring.  The remedial context would both 
legitimate and facilitate a level of active regulatory oversight – of the election process, of 
the provision of information, of meetings, and of enforcement activity – that would be 
necessary for a representation scheme to function in a hostile environment, but that would 
be infeasible across the board.  
But there is another side to the logic of a “representation remedy”:  The typical low-
wage employer might find such a prospect alarming enough to be worth avoiding; it 
might help to deter misconduct.  There is ample evidence that union avoidance – indeed, 
aggressive and, if necessary, illegal union suppression – is a central tenet of the low-wage 
model of production. 144  It is part of cluster of illegalities, along with health and safety, 
wage and hour, and immigration violations, that characterizes much of this layer of the 
labor market.  Apparently low-wage employers perceive independent employee 
representation as a danger assiduously to be avoided.  That would make the 
“representation remedy” a significant deterrent – a novel “big gun.”  Government-
imposed employee representation is not the equivalent of shutting a business down, or of 
144
 See Harry C. Katz & Owen Darbishire, Converging Divergences:  Worldwide Changes in 
Employment Systems 21-22 (2000).
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crippling fines.  And it should not supplant other remedies and penalties for non-
compliance.  But as part of the regulatory response to a pattern of illegality, it may be 
quite a fearsome prospect and a useful addition to the standard remedial arsenal.  
Of course, the atmosphere of threats and fear by which employers often suppress 
union activity in these low-wage workplaces makes it hard to imagine how a 
government-imposed employee representation scheme could function effectively.  There 
is a significant risk that these bodies would become a sham or, worse, an anti-union 
device.  Clearly a “representation remedy” would require oversight, support, and 
protection – by the public agency or an independent monitor with a direct line to the 
agency – to insure the independence of the employee representatives and their protection 
from reprisals.  But if that could be done, the employee representatives would provide a 
very useful channel of information from inside these worst workplaces to external public 
and private enforcement authorities.  
The low wage sector presents many challenges to this or any enforcement strategy.  
Some low-wage employers have such a tenuous investment in capital and reputation that 
going out of business may be a low-cost response to enforcement.  But where those low-
wage employers supply labor or products to more rooted and visible employers, and 
where the latter can be brought within the regulatory net – either by their potential 
liability as joint employers of the low-wage workers or by the “hot goods” embargo –
there are economic carrots as well as regulatory sticks to deploy.  The “representation 
remedy,” like the monitoring arrangements in the DOL’s apparel program, might become 
part of what the latter, larger employers can be induced to exact from their contractors as 
a cost of doing business.  
The full implementation of this or any scheme of employee representation in the US 
may be a long time coming.  The politics are unpromising, given the likelihood of both 
employer opposition and union skepticism.   In the meantime, however, existing 
experiments in self-regulation show the way to better mechanisms for securing labor 
standards compliance, even among marginal low-wage segments of the labor market.  
Effective enforcement of minimum standards in the workplace depends on liberating 
employee voice from the shackles of fear and insecurity, and on aggregating that 
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employee voice to overcome the collective action problems that depress efforts to secure 
what are typically “public” workplace goods.  The two parts of this strategy are 
intertwined, and must both be part of any effective regulatory strategy for the low-wage 
workplace.  
C. Other Forms of Worker Representation within a System of Monitored Self-
Regulation
The pace and extent of change in the organization of work, while it is sometimes 
exaggerated, does pose a serious challenge to conventional conceptions of employee self-
governance.  Looking forward, it will be necessary to devise forms of employee 
representation for workers who do not belong to a stable and cohesive community of 
workers within a single physical work site, or who are unable to traverse the long and 
perilous path to exclusive majority employee representation within a particular 
workplace.  
One possibility is for unions to expand their horizons and their activities to 
encompass non-exclusive, non-majority forms of representation.  Some workers may be 
organizable or even organized along craft or occupational lines; others may be organized 
by region or industry.145  Others have explored the possibilities for non-exclusive union 
representation and the role that such organizations might play in the enforcement of 
employment law.146  One such model is “Open-Source Unionism,” put forward by 
Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers.147  They propose that unions affiliate with 
workers as individuals or as less-than-majority groups of workers, and offer services –
145
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including information, expertise, and even representation in the enforcement of 
workplace rights – outside the exclusive collective bargaining setting.  Freeman and 
Rogers put much emphasis on the ability to offer many of these services, and to create a 
network of union-friendly workers, at very low cost over the Internet.  
Unions operating on such a model may assist workers in identifying violations; they 
may provide legal representation to employees seeking to vindicate their rights; they may 
alert public agencies to the existence of violations and pressure them to prosecute them; 
they may publicize violations and generate public and consumer pressure on violators.148
Many of these activities would strengthen a system of monitored self-regulation 
indirectly by increasing the prospects for adversarial public or private enforcement.  To 
the extent unions’ role extends to the prosecution of private rights of actions, I will return 
to it in the next section.  But non-majority unions could also participate more directly in a 
system of monitored self-regulation.  For example, they could, as they do in the Green 
Grocer Code of Conduct, compose part of the oversight body for code monitors.149  They 
could provide a check against cheating on the part of self-regulators by providing a back-
channel from employees to monitors or regulators.  And they could assist and even 
represent employee whistleblowers who suffered reprisals for reporting violations inside 
or outside the firm.  
Of course once unions step outside the scope of exclusive collective bargaining, they 
may be in competition with other organizations that advocate the interests of workers or 
particular groups of workers.150  Workers’ centers and advocacy groups, many of which 
respond to the interests of immigrant workers from particular ethnic groups, can do many 
of the things that unions can do (and have sometimes proven willing to do them when 
unions have not).151  One such a group, Casa Mexico, provided that kind of 
148
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representation in securing, and then in overseeing enforcement of, the GGCC on behalf 
of the predominantly Mexican green grocer workforce.  Unions that have evolved in the 
collective bargaining context begin with the advantages of expertise, a large 
organizational base, and the resources that go with it.  But if unions are not both willing 
and able to assist workers whom they do not represent in an exclusive collective 
bargaining context (and who they are not currently seeking to organize on that basis), 
then other groups can and should step into that role.152
D. A Role for Private Litigation 
I began by dividing the growing field of employment law into employee rights 
enforceable through litigation and workplace standards enforced by regulatory agencies.  
But that division turns out to be somewhat artificial, for employee rights, some of them 
backed with private rights of action, are embedded within many of the labor standards 
regimes, and offer potential leverage to private sector worker advocates.  Private lawsuits 
can potentially help to fill the enforcement gap left by the undercommitment of public 
resources; indeed, they can sometimes supply a “big gun” where public enforcement has 
none to wield.  They can also provide a check on public agencies’ failure to enforce the 
laws.153  Private rights of action can function as “destabilization rights.”154  They can help 
mobilize or simply bypass public regulators that become captured, hamstrung, sclerotic, 
or ideologically resistant to enforcing statutory labor standards. 
Of course they can do that only where the law affords private rights of action.  There 
are essentially none to be had within the arena of occupational health and safety.  Unlike 
the FLSA, OSHA affords no private right of action to employees who are subjected to 
152
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safety hazards or injured as a result of noncompliance.  Nor can workers turn to state tort 
law to promote health and safety reforms indirectly.  Tort law would normally make 
firms internalize the cost of injuries caused by workplace hazards, and would stimulate 
precautions against accidents.155  But state worker compensation laws channel nearly all 
workplace injury claims out of the tort system and into a low-profile, sub-compensatory 
administrative system.156  Whatever creative energies might have been unleashed by the 
threat of megabucks tort liability for workplace accidents remain well caged.  
Even private rights of action for employee whistleblowers who are fired for reporting 
safety concerns are rare and endangered.  OSHA’s whistleblower protection provision –
an administrative remedy that affords no private right of action and no compensatory or 
exemplary damages – is notoriously ineffectual.157  Several state courts have held that the 
discharge of job safety whistleblowers violates public policy and is a tort.158  But some 
state courts foreclose such common law actions based on the existence of a remedy under 
OSHA.159  A major goal for the improvement of health and safety regulation, and an 
important condition for the development of an effective system of monitored self-
155
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regulation, must be the preservation and expansion of private rights of action in this 
arena.160
But where there are private rights of action, litigation has proven to be a potent 
stimulus to workplace reform.  We in the US do not do regulation especially well, but we 
do litigation better than any society in the world.  Litigation has effectively become our 
primary mode of workplace regulation in some areas, especially under the civil rights 
laws.  Consider the impact of discrimination and harassment lawsuits on employer 
practices and workplace culture.  Patterns of conduct that were endemic to many 
workplaces began to produce costly judgments in a relative handful of cases; employers 
responded eventually with an arsenal of antidiscrimination and antiharassment policies 
and procedures – and with what now goes under the name of “diversity initiatives” – that 
have genuinely transformed the employment landscape and the working environment for 
many women and minorities.  Antidiscrimination doctrine has lately come around to 
formally recognizing and rewarding those initiatives, giving further impetus to their 
growth.  Private litigation has effectively brought about the existing regime of “regulated 
self-regulation” in the workplace.
Private litigation under the wage and hours laws has much the same potential.  Until 
recently, private wage and hour litigation was a rather negligible phenomenon largely 
confined to small claims courts and bankruptcy proceedings.  But the private bar has 
recently discovered that aggregate wage and hours claims – including those on behalf of 
low-wage workers – can be very lucrative:  Both the violations and the resulting 
liabilities are often substantial and provable.161  Employers have begun to take notice of 
the resulting surge of lawsuits alleging the violation of state and federal wage and hours 
160
 That might be done through an expansion of tort liability, through reform of workers compensation, 
or a combination.  See William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety and Health in 
the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives that Influence Employer Decisions to 
Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. Ken. L. Rev. 9 (1989). 
161
 The FLSA itself allows for “collective actions,” a form of opt-in group action.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§216(b).  Parallel state statutes may permit “class actions” under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or the equivalent, which permit opt-out actions.  See e.g., Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating 
Corp., No. 00 Civ. 253(AKH), 201 F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y., 2001).  The latter allows for the pursuit of 
hundreds or even thousands of workers’ claims without first recruiting individual plaintiffs.  But the former 
is simpler to prosecute.  See Mark J. Neuberger , Punching the Clock Is Not So Simple: An Old Statute 
Holds New Perils  for Employers, as Workers Increasingly Sue, Alleging Wage and Hour Violations, 26 
Nat’l L. J. – (Jan. 13, 2003).
SELF-REGULATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE PAGE 71
laws.  Given the number of employees and hours at issue in many of these lawsuits, and 
once taking into account the prospect of attorneys’ fees and the likely prospect of 
liquidated damages, these suits may spell disaster for the affected firms.  
Undoubtedly employers operating under the “shadow of the law” are reexamining 
their wage and hour practices and in many instances reforming them to avoid becoming 
the next defendant.  Even venerable Wal-Mart, Inc., has proven vulnerable to the threat of 
large scale litigation and liability, and has responded by instituting “a new Corporate 
Compliance team … to oversee Wal-Mart's compliance in a number of areas, including 
the company's obligations to associates in terms of pay, working hours and time for 
breaks.”162 The firm has vowed to use its much-touted information technology systems 
to ensure that workers do not work more than the law permits or get paid for less than 
they work.163
One may hope that this new internal compliance machinery actually improves labor 
practices; one may be sure that it will feature in future litigation against the firm.  Future 
lawsuits against the company are likely to be met with the argument that, as under 
Kolstad, their maintenance of preventive procedures should afford them at least a partial 
defense – say, against liquidated damages otherwises available for “willful” violation of 
the FLSA.  Those arguments would then bring into play all of the same concerns about 
the adequacy of internal procedures and of judicial oversight that were rehearsed in the 
context of the rights model into the heart of this quintessentially regulatory scheme.  
Moreover, employers increasingly seek to preclude wage and hour litigation by including 
such claims within mandatory arbitration clauses, and courts have mostly upheld the 
arbitrability of such claims.164  While such clauses have heretofore been rare among the 
low-wage workers who feature in much FLSA litigation, that may be changing as the 
threat of litigation on behalf of these workers grows.  
162 Wal-Mart Details Progress Toward Becoming a Leader in Employment Practices, Press Release, 
June 04, 2004 (available at http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/Mainnews.jsp).
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So wage and hour litigation, much like antidiscrimination litigation, has already 
begun to promote self-regulation.  Depending on whether internal preventive procedures 
and mandatory arbitration can be made fair and effective means of avoiding or resolving 
employees’ legal claims – a question raised above and yet to be answered – these 
procedures could either enhance or largely diffuse the potential of wage and hour 
litigation to effectively reform internal practices.  As in the case of antidiscrimination 
law, it remains to be seen whether those mechanisms of self-regulation can be made 
effective, or whether they will operate instead mainly as defensive tactics, stifling the 
litigation threat that has been the main engine of organizational reform.  In other words, it 
is already too late to ask whether wage and hour litigation will lead to self-regulation; the 
question is whether it will lead to effective self-regulation or to something more like self-
deregulation.  
Can private litigation help bring into being a regime of “monitored self-regulation” 
of labor standards?165  Consider, for example, the widespread “off-the-clock” practices 
that have been the target of extensive litigation at Wal-Mart,166 or the recently-publicized 
and surprisingly common employer practice of “shaving time” – of doctoring hourly 
employees’ time sheets to reduce their pay.167  Whether these acts are the isolated and 
unauthorized acts of rogue supervisors, as employers claim, or the pervasive and tacitly 
encouraged cost-cutting strategies that the lawsuits allege, they occur under the radar and 
risk being continued even after being proven, declared unlawful, and retrospectively 
remedied.  Wal-Mart, for its part, has promised an internal fix through its “corporate 
compliance” program, and if workers and their advocates trust Wal-Mart to regulate 
itself, that might be a satisfactory prospective resolution of the problem.  But if workers 
165
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and their advocates are inclined instead to live by the Reaganesque aphorism, “Trust, but 
verify,” it would be a short and sensible step to incorporate independent monitoring of 
Wal-Mart’s compliance into a prospective remedy or settlement of these claims.  For the 
pendency of litigation and the threat of megabucks liability may give employee advocates 
much the same leverage over employers that government regulators used to secure 
monitoring in the apparel industry and the green grocers.  While compensation is 
undoubtedly a major goal of these lawsuits – particularly where they are prosecuted by 
private attorneys on a contingency basis – some of the potential liability for past 
misconduct might be provisionally traded off in exchange for the firms’ submission to a 
system of monitoring that promised to prevent continuing violations.  The absence of a 
state agency from the constellation of actors in most of these cases is not obviously fatal 
to the prospects of a viable system of monitored self-regulation.  
Once again, the proposed strategy has been pioneered in private antidiscrimination 
litigation.  We have already observed that the defenses that Title VII affords to “self-
regulating” firms provides a potential precedent for employers seeking partial relief from 
wage and hour liability on the basis of internal compliance machinery.  Faragher and 
Kolstad represent what we might call a “wholesale” approach to the promotion of self-
regulatory practices:  they create a self-regulatory template on which liability- averse 
employers can model their conduct to reduce legal exposure.  But antidiscrimination law 
also has been deployed to induce self-regulatory behavior at the “retail” level:  under the 
gun of actual litigation, employers may agree or be required to accept more intrusive 
forms of internal reform, including outside monitoring.  Professor Susan Sturm has 
explored the institution of internal organizational reforms, which may include ongoing 
consultation with independent experts – as part of the remedy for large-scale employment 
discrimination litigation.168  She has argued that these “structural” remedies – some of 
which resemble privately monitored self-regulation – effectively extend the reach of law 
and of antidiscrimination norms to uncover and alter subtly discriminatory practices that 
traditional remedies do not.  
168
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Large-scale private wage and hour cases could similarly be resolved in part on the 
basis of the employer’s adoption of internal compliance measures – for example, 
technological safeguards against off-the-clock work, and use of discipline and incentives 
to insure supervisory cooperation – coupled with outside monitoring.  Whether employers 
adopt such measures as a shield against future litigation or under the gun of threatened 
liabilities for past misconduct, there is a risk that these private monitoring arrangements, 
which are often shielded from public scrutiny by strong confidentiality agreements, might 
be susceptible to cheating and capture – that they might give (or even sell) a valuable 
stamp of legitimacy to employers while failing to insure compliance.  Some form of 
employee representation in the oversight of private monitoring arrangements might help 
to avoid that risk.  Clearly these private settlements present pitfalls that the involvement 
of public agencies can help to avoid.  But creative and committed employee advocates –
lawyers and non-profit organizations – together with the emergence of experienced and 
publicly-vetted monitoring organizations – also have an important role to play at least in 
the current environment of public underenforcement of labor standards.  
Apart from direct enforcement of labor standards through private litigation, private 
rights of action on behalf of whistleblowers – employees who have suffered reprisals for 
publicizing illegal conduct, either within the firm or to public officials – can help to 
enable employees themselves to serve an internal monitoring function.  OSHA-like 
administrative remedies appear too ineffectual to draw either public attention or employer 
apprehension.  Employees who blow the whistle on workplace hazards need their own 
Sarbanes-Oxley-like remedy against reprisals.  Law reform that protects and expands 
whistleblower protections where they do not already exist, and a concerted commitment 
by employee advocates to pursue whistleblower claims for workers who expose illegal 
employment practices would bolster both the enforcement of labor standards and the role 
of employees in such enforcement.
VI. Monitored Self-Regulation in the Enforcement of Individual Rights 
There has been comparatively little effort to apply theories of effective self-
regulation within the decentralized system of individual rights enforcement that makes up 
SELF-REGULATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE PAGE 75
so much of the American law of the workplace.169  In some ways the theories may seem 
an awkward fit with the decentralized and mostly judicial regime of individual rights 
enforcement.  But the emergence of privately monitored self-regulation in conjunction 
with antidiscrimination litigation shows that employment practice may be running ahead 
of the theory in this regard.  
Indeed, in one way the rights arena may be a more promising site for the application 
of theories of effective self-regulation than, for example, workplace health and safety 
regulation.  The latter is plagued by chronic underregulation.  The former is not.  In the 
rights arena, the regulatory resources are not so much lacking as they are misallocated, 
yielding wildly inconsistent results and levels of procedural fairness – a gold-plated 
enforcement process for some and no hearing at all for most potential claimants.  Still, 
the decentralized process of initiating enforcement – the ability of private complainants 
and their lawyers to file lawsuits, trigger discovery, and command at least some level of 
judicial process – creates many regulatory eyes and makes the threat of outside scrutiny 
much more present in the rights arena than in the regulatory arena.  The question is 
whether those rights-enforcement resources might be more effectively deployed, and 
whether the ongoing move toward self-regulation within rights-enforcement might be 
better channeled, by some form of monitored self-regulation.  
Antidiscrimination law has been the most prolific source of employment litigation, 
and the most powerful impetus toward self-regulation in the enforcement of rights.  It 
also has the virtue, as compared with the patchwork of state wrongful discharge and 
privacy law, of doctrinal coherence.  It will therefore be my focus here.
A. Recasting the Tripartite Regime
It may be useful to begin by recasting the characters that populate the “tripartite” 
system to fit the rights arena.  The objects of regulatory scrutiny – the regulated firms –
are the same, as are the challenges of heterogeneity and endogeneity:  Firms, and 
individuals within firms, may be more or less committed to respecting the worker rights 
recognized by external law.  Some may voluntarily establish standards of fair treatment 
169
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and equal opportunity that exceed what the law could require; others may do only what is 
necessary to fend off costly lawsuits (and may be expected to “cheat” – for example, to 
hide evidence of rights violations – if they can get away with it).  On that score, the value 
of multiple enforcement tracks and of efforts to tap into regulatory resources within firms 
is apparent, as is the need for oversight.
The main public regulators in the enforcement of individual rights are not 
administrative agencies but courts.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and coordinate state agencies play a role in enforcing antidiscrimination law, one 
to which I will return.170  But courts still adjudicate claims and assess the fairness of 
internal antidiscrimination procedures and the enforceability of arbitration agreements; 
they are the primary public agencies for enforcing most employee rights and overseeing 
the emerging regime of self-regulation.  Antidiscrimination law directs courts, in effect, 
to judge whether the firm is a “cooperator” or a “defector” in deciding whether to take a 
more cooperative approach to the firm – for example, to enforce arbitration agreements, 
give deferential review to arbitration awards, or grant a defense to liability based on the 
existence of internal antidiscrimination procedures – or a more “adversarial” approach –
for example, by refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement or by allowing a punitive 
damages claim to go to the jury.  
That brings us to the third leg of the tripartite scheme, which is supposed to guard 
against excessive cooperation by judges (for example, unwarranted deference to internal 
and arbitral proceedings) and against “cheating” by firms (for example, the institution of 
biased internal or arbitral procedures).  It may seem tendentious to call excessive judicial 
deference to arbitration awards a form of “capture,” but it is much the sort of 
underregulation or over-cooperation that the tripartism is designed to guard against.  
More generally, there is a need for actors to watch out for those individuals who are not 
inside the self-regulating firms but whose rights are potentially at stake – most 
importantly, the job candidates who are passed over for discriminatory reasons (but who 
170
 The EEOC issues rulings interpreting the law, for example, with respect to the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements; but those rulings are not always granted deference by the courts.  The EEOC and 
parallel state agencies can resolve disputes without litigation (and have been particularly aggressive and 
quite successful in the use of mediation to that end); and they act as institutional representatives in litigating 
claims with special public import.  
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rarely sue).  Those individuals are particularly in need of some third party – neither the 
regulated employers nor the courts that stand in judgment over the employment decisions 
that are challenged – to uphold the public interest in equal opportunity.  What is needed is 
some actor or set of actors with enough independence, expertise, and accountability to 
employee interests to perform those functions.  
B. The Functions and Limits of Collective Representation in Individual Rights 
Enforcement
One possible actor within the scheme is a union or union-like organization.  But the 
role of a union is less obvious in the rights context than it was in the labor standards 
context.  There is at least a potential tension between the individual and minority group 
rights at stake in most statutory employment disputes and the collective and presumably 
majoritarian nature of a union or elected employee council.  Rights claims often concern 
the allocation of workplace goods such as promotions and layoffs among employees.  
Those goods themselves are not “public goods” in the same sense as, for example, a 
healthy physical environment.  Claims of discrimination, in particular, may highlight 
fault lines within the workforce such as race and gender, and may pit one group of 
employee against another – as with claims of co-worker harassment.  In these cases, a 
collective representative is in a difficult position if it must directly represent any or all of 
the employees, and its representation may be skewed in favor of majority sentiment.171
Such concerns, and the blemished history of American unions’ treatment of women 
and racial minority groups and their claims of discrimination, surely played a part in the 
decades-old series of Supreme Court decisions rejecting the applicability of collectively 
bargained arbitration provisions to individual statutory claims and affirming individual 
sovereignty over those claims.172  The implication of Gilmer is that individual employees 
are, after all, best situated to represent their own interests in the realm of rights, and in the 
171
 When such a conflict arises under a collective bargaining agreement, the union can stand behind 
widely accepted principles of seniority or “just cause” that may mediate the conflict.  They do not have the 
same recourse in the case of statutory claims.
172
 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 
Inc, 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
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waiver of rights, without the intervention of a collective representative. 173  Is collective 
representation simply out of place in this regime of individual rights and remedies?  
What Gilmer, on this reading, forgets is that the quality of dispute resolution 
procedures is a local public good within the workplace.  Even though employees assert 
individual claims and seek individual redress, the emergence of firm-based enforcement 
mechanisms as a partial substitute for litigation creates collective action problems for 
employees.  Firms cannot customize their internal grievance or arbitration procedures for 
individual employees or seek employees’ individual agreement to those procedures.  The 
could perhaps customize the terms or applicability of arbitration agreements, but they 
rarely do so.  Whether because of the administrative advantages of a single system or just 
because they can, employers typically present an arbitration agreement as “take it or 
leave it” proposition.  That means that individual employees, even if they had a realistic 
chance to object to features of the arbitration or grievance system, would effectively do 
so on behalf of the entire group of employees who are covered, and would effectively 
share any improvements with her co-workers.  
The flipside of the “public goods” problem that employees face is the advantage that 
employers have by virtue of being “repeat players” in their chosen dispute resolution 
forum.  One aspect of the problem – hotly contested by scholars and arbitrators – is the 
risk that the arbitrator’s judgment may be skewed in favor of the employer, who may be 
in a position to choose the arbitrator in the future, and against the employee, who is 
typically a “one-shot” player.174  Whether or not that is a real problem, however, the 
employer’s status as a “repeat player” certainly increases its incentive to invest in shaping 
the dispute resolution and arbitration processes in its own interest.  An employee 
173
 In subsequently upholding the individual contractual waiver of the judicial forum in Gilmer, the 
Court distinguished those cases, in part, based on “the potential disparity in interests between a union and 
an employee.”  Gilmer.
174
 As with everything else about employment arbitration, the empirical evidence on the existence of a 
repeat player effect is mixed. For studies finding evidence of a repeat player bias, see Lisa B. Bingham, 
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 Employee Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 189, 191 (1997); Lisa 
S. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of 
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 223 (1998).  For studies purporting to refute such 
bias, see Michael Delikat, Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: 
Where do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 56 (2004); Elizabeth Hill, AAA 
Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 9 (2003).
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representative with a role in the design of the process and the selection of arbitrators 
could serve as a “repeat player” on the side of employees. 
An employee representative could also help to mitigate employees’ fear of reprisals 
for objective to employer policies.  In the case of arbitration agreements, reprisals are not 
merely feared but effectively legitimized by the law, for in most jurisdictions employers 
can and do demand an agreement to arbitrate future disputes as a condition of 
employment or of continued employment; in other words, employees, at least if they are 
at-will, can be fired for refusing to agree to mandatory arbitration.175  Given that the 
agreement only applies in case of a dispute that has not yet arisen and hopefully never 
will, employees will rarely find it worthwhile even to utter an objection to the agreement; 
the potential cost – loss of a job – is simply too high.176  An institutional representative of 
the employees, because it has no job to give up, may avoid this problem as well as the 
public goods problem and the repeat player problem. 177
Still, the potential conflicts of interest between a majoritarian institution and 
employees asserting individual statutory rights should constrain the former’s role in the 
policing of rights-enforcement within the firm.  A union should not be able to waive an 
175
 Under California law, which appears to be the most demanding with regard to the “voluntariness” of 
the agreement, an agreement that is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of employment is 
deemed “procedurally unconscionable.”  But that conclusion simply triggers a closer scrutiny of the 
fairness of the terms of the agreement itself.  An agreement is invalid only if it is both “procedurally” and 
“substantively unconscionable.”  Armendariz, Circuit City, etc.
176
 There are additional cognitive and informational impediments to individual bargaining over what 
procedures will apply to future disputes:  Employees lack information about the employer’s discharge and 
layoff practices; they are systematically misinformed about the law that applies to discharges; they may 
underestimate the chances that they will end up in a legal dispute over such issues; they may fear that 
raising questions about these issues will label them as a troublemaker or a slacker who expects to encounter 
difficulties.  All of these objections have been levied against the contractual default of employment at will 
and the assumption that employees who want job security can bargain or shop around for it. e.g., Samuel 
Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1783 
(1996); Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible 
Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1953 (1996); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with 
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell 
L. Rev. 105 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106 (2002).  These 
concerns are even more acute as to the subtler question of what the procedure and forum will be in the 
event of a future dispute.  
177
 Unions perform all of these functions within “labor arbitration” – adjustment and arbitration of 
grievances under collective bargaining agreements.  Labor arbitration is widely viewed as a model system 
of dispute resolution, in which both labor and management generally support a deferential standard of 
judicial review because both shape the process and choose the arbitrators.  
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individual’s right to judicial process for statutory claims, and should not act as gatekeeper 
to the arbitral process where it provides an individual’s only recourse for a statutory 
claim.178
What employees do share in these cases is an interest in the fairness of dispute 
resolution processes.  Both arbitration and internal dispute resolution mechanisms 
typically cover a very broad range of disputes.  Nearly all employees face some prospect 
of using these mechanisms in a future a dispute.  A collective representative of 
employees can help to secure the basic elements of “due process.”  It can also become the 
repository of employees’ collective experience over time, with the capacity to advise 
employees on choice of arbitrators, to represent employees who cannot or do not choose 
to get an attorney, and in general to counterbalance the employer’s aggregate experience 
and its long-term incentive to make the process work to its advantage.  
C. Other Potential Monitors in Rights Enforcement
So there is a perfectly sound theoretical case for conditioning legal deference to self-
regulatory processes on collective employee participation in the formulation and 
administration of these processes.  But as in the case of labor standards regulation, reality 
demurs.  Such a proposal has no chance of implementation in the current political and 
labor relations climate.  As in the case of labor standards enforcement, we are faced with 
the need to convene a constellation of actors that together can supply the independence, 
expertise, and accountability to workers’ shared interests that individual employees lack.  
It turns out, however, that a lot of “monitoring” is already going on.  Several sets of 
actors already play distinct “monitoring” functions within the existing system of self-
regulation of rights enforcement:  First, advocacy groups, including unions acting as non-
exclusive representatives, civil rights groups and identity-based organizations; second, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and their professional organizations such as the National 
178
 Whether unions have the power to consent to the mandatory arbitration of individual statutory claims 
is currently an open and contested question.  In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 
(1998), the Supreme Court held that, at a minimum, a collectively-bargained waiver of the judicial forum 
for individual statutory claims would have to be “clear and unmistakable.”  But it declined to consider 
whether such a waiver would be enforceable.  Some courts have held, following Wright, that it would, and 
that unions do have the power to waive individual employees’ right to litigate statutory claims.  See, e.g., 
Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir.  2001). 
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Employment Lawyers Association (NELA); third, arbitrators and their own professional 
organizations such as the American Arbitration Association; and, fourth, the EEOC and 
its state analogues.  Based on a better understanding of what each of these actors do and 
are equipped to do, I offer some proposals for improving the quality and efficacy of their 
monitoring roles.  
Advocacy organizations:  There are many employee advocacy groups that can help 
to monitor employers’ enforcement of employee rights.  Unions, as discussed above, can 
play such a role on a non-exclusive basis outside of collective bargaining.  In addition, 
many civil rights organizations and identity-based organizations promote the interests of 
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based groups within the workforce.  They may be 
organized around particular racial or ethnic groups as in the case of the Urban League or 
La Raza; they may represent a range of racial and ethnic groups as in Jesse Jackson’s 
Rainbow Coalition; they may even represent particular groups within particular 
occupations or industries, as in the Society of Women Engineers.  
Those groups play a key role in publicizing (and thereby punishing) perceived 
employment discrimination against the groups they represent.  They may become 
involved at the behest of individuals in connection with very particular events, or they 
may monitor broader statistical patterns of employment, identifying firms that lag behind 
industry norms and seem potentially to be discriminating.  They may encourage or 
sponsor litigation, or they may even represent individuals or classes in arbitration or in 
litigation, at which point their role begins to blend into the role of plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
which I will discuss next.179  Through a wide range of advocacy efforts, such groups can 
play a very important watchdog role over firms when they are not under the spotlight of 
litigation, especially with respect to individuals who are not within those firms because 
they were not hired there.  
I want to be precise, however, about how these groups can be seen as helping to 
“monitor” a regime of self-regulation in the enforcement of rights:  Employers 
predictably reform their employment practices and their patterns of hiring, promotions, 
179
 For a proposal for union representation of individuals and groups of employees in mandatory 
arbitration, see Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral 
Representation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 75 (2002).
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and discharges, to reduce their exposure to discrimination litigation.  We may call that 
“self-regulation,” but it is simply the familiar “shadow of the law” variety of self-
regulation.  When the law begins to take account of those internal reforms in assessing 
the firm’s liability, it becomes of interest here.  That happens most obviously in litigation, 
as where Kostad and Faragher invite firms to put forward aspects of their “diversity 
programs” as a basis for avoiding punitive damages in a hiring discrimination case, or for 
escaping liability for co-worker or supervisor harassment.  It happens more subtly in 
efforts to avoid becoming a target of litigation:  Firms may advertise themselves as 
leaders in workforce diversity in part to avoid the scrutiny, publicity, and disruption of a 
lawsuit.  But the reality may not be as advertised.  Advocacy groups with have a birds-
eye view of the labor market and a constituency that turns to them with experiences of 
frustration in the job market may be in an especially good position to see through sham 
programs and undeserved corporate reputations.  Groups that informally monitor the 
workforce demographics of major corporations may also simply spur firms to stay at the 
head of the pack, or at least to avoid falling behind, in workforce diversity efforts lest 
they become the target of a damaging publicity campaign (with or without a lawsuit).  
This is not exactly rights enforcement; it goes well beyond rooting out illegal practices.  
But it may be the best way of addressing subtle and hidden barriers to equal opportunity 
with which traditional legal tools have such difficulty.  Advocacy groups effectively 
extend the shadow of the law and increase the weight of public norms within firms’ 
internal operations.
Even better would be systematic comparisons of firms’ practices and demographics 
based on detailed inside information from managers and employees.  That is in fact 
already being done privately by a publication, Diversity, Inc., that has made itself the 
leading publicist for corporate diversity efforts.  Its annual ranking of “Top Companies 
for Diversity,” and the various subrankings and subindices that it compiles and 
publicizes, may not have quite the impact of the US News educational rankings, but it has 
the same aspiration and is headed in the same direction:  It aims to bring greater precision 
and accuracy to firms’ reputations in this area, and to spur firms to improve their 
performance and their ranking.  (So, too, its success is sure to breed questionable 
reporting practices and questions about the reliability of the indices.)  
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At the same time, Diversity, Inc., undertakes in every issue to publicize programs 
that work, for example, to retain and advance women during child-rearing years, to 
increase the numbers and qualifications of Latino applicants through cooperation with 
local educators, or to reduce subtle barriers for disabled workers.  The magazine is in the 
business of identifying and publicizing “best practices” among firms.  It is an example of 
how outside monitoring by private groups, with the cooperation of the monitored firms 
themselves, is evolving spontaneously around the edges of the law and dealing with 
problems that have proven obdurate.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys:  Plaintiffs’ attorneys represent employees literally, and pursuant 
to professional obligations of loyalty and zeal.  Moreover, most are “repeat players” on 
the employees’ side.  Sometimes, as in the remedial phase of a large-scale lawsuit, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys may become directly involved in the restructuring and oversight of 
employers’ internal antidiscrimination machinery.  Professor Sturm has described several 
such cases and contended for the valuable role that attorneys and other intermediaries –
expert witnesses, consultants, and insurers, for example – can play inside organizations 
that have come directly under the bright light of litigation.180  The systematic reforms 
devised in that exceptional context might also become a template for firms that aim to 
avoid litigation.  In both the remedial and the prophylactic context, the precepts of 
monitored self-regulation call for close scrutiny of the independence of monitors from 
employers, and their accountability in some manner to employees and the public.  So, for 
example, employers’ own consultants and insurers may be more attuned to reducing the 
risk of litigation than they are to redressing rights violations.  Those may sometimes 
conflict, for example, where the issue is how to gather or disseminate information about 
racial and gender disparities in promotions.
Outside of those large scale cases, attorneys’ capacity to act as monitors for 
employees is limited by the fact that they usually enter the picture only after a claim 
arises, and often after internal review of the claim.  So in the case of internal grievance 
procedures, plaintiffs’ attorneys cannot participate directly in shaping those processes.  
Still, they can play a post-hoc monitoring role when these internal procedures are raised 
180
 See Sturm, supra note --.
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as a partial or complete defense to liability, at which point the attorneys will be highly 
motivated and professionally obliged to point out flaws in employers’ internal 
procedures.  In that context they may be able to guard against some kinds of employer 
“cheating” and some kinds of judicial “capture,” and to make law to which employers 
respond prospectively, but it an indirect, attenuated, and episodic form of participation.  
In the arbitral process, plaintiffs’ attorneys play a larger role.  On behalf of the employees 
they represent, they can challenge the fairness and adequacy of arbitration procedures 
both in individual cases and more systemically.  Still, their ability to shape arbitration 
agreements and processes is largely indirect and dependent on their ability to secure 
judicial disapproval of unfair provisions.  We have already observed some of the 
limitations of these judicial oversight mechanisms.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys collectively – for example, through organizations such as NELA 
– can play a broader role as advocates for employees in shaping both the law of 
arbitration and the practices of arbitrators (on which more below).  But even in that 
broader role, plaintiffs’ attorneys can arguably be counted on only to represent the 
interests of those whom they are likely represent in the future.  Traditionally, that has 
been more highly-paid employees who can either afford their fees or whose claims 
promise a high payoff.  Paradoxically, that might lead plaintiffs’ attorneys to lobby for 
too much process – for trial-like procedures that make arbitration a closer substitute for 
litigation, but that may also make it too expensive for lower-income employees with 
smaller claims who cannot get an attorney.  Those employees might be able to get an 
arbitral hearing if that process is significantly cheaper than litigation.  A collective 
employee representative would be expected to consider the benefits of arbitration 
(especially for employees whose claims would not otherwise be viable in court) as well 
as its limitations, and to lobby for a process that is broadly accessible as well as thorough.
On the other hand, concerns about the role of plaintiffs’ attorneys in arbitration may 
be misdirected.  They may represent, directly and indirectly, a broader range of 
employees if the law develops so as to ensure the ability to bring aggregate claims or 
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class actions within arbitration.181  Even in individual litigation, many plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are doing valuable work for all employees in contesting arbitration agreements 
and provisions that are grossly skewed in favor of employers:  limitations on remedies, 
short limitations periods, biased tribunals, high and often prohibitive arbitrators’ fees, and 
the like.  They are in effect monitoring this important form of self-regulation on behalf of 
employees generally.  For plaintiffs’ attorneys to serve this monitoring role, it is essential 
that arbitration procedures make it financially feasible for attorneys to both participate in 
arbitration and to contest arbitrability (for example, by insisting that arbitration 
agreements explicitly provide for the award of attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs).182
One further innovation would enhance the ability of plaintiffs’ attorneys to play a 
broader monitoring role on behalf of employees:  Public disclosure of arbitration 
agreements.  If employers were required or induced to publicly disclose the basic terms 
of any mandatory arbitration agreements to which they and their employees were party –
on the internet, for example – monitoring would be improved on several fronts.  Lawyers 
and other advocates could identify and challenge questionable provisions outside the 
context of arbitration; employers could better be held accountable in the job market for 
unfairly skewed procedures; “best practices” in the form of model arbitration procedures 
could better emerge.  
Arbitrators and their organizations:  Viewed through the lens of tripartism, 
arbitrators might be seen variously as regulators exercising powers delegated by the 
public judiciary or as agents of the parties – both employers and employees.  But they are 
not well suited to serving as independent advocates of employees.  To begin with, they 
are at least as much an agent of the employer, and often more so if we attribute any 
significance to the employer’s status as a repeat player or to the fact that the employer 
181
 The availability of class action mechanisms under mandatory arbitration remains an open issue.  The 
Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. 2402, 156 L.Ed.2d 414 (2003), allowed 
a class action arbitration under the FAA (in a non-employment case) where the particular agreement at 
issue did not preclude class treatment.  That leaves open the question whether an agreement that does 
explicitly preclude class action adjudication would be valid or not, particularly under the employment 
discrimination laws.  For a discussion of the issues remaining after Bazzle, see Samuel Estreicher & 
Michael J. Puma, Arbitration and Class Actions After Bazzle, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 13 (2003
182
 On the other hand, some systems that allow attorney representation (and compensation) but that 
invite complainants to proceed without attorneys – for example, in exchange for the employers’ foregoing 
attorney representation – appear to work reasonably well.   
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often pays the whole arbitrator’s fee.  In particular, arbitrators cannot serve as employee 
representatives within the self-regulatory process of formulating the terms of arbitration 
agreements because they are called into service by those very agreements, are by and 
large bound by their terms.
On the other hand, arbitrators and their professional associations do play a crucial 
role in monitoring the arbitral process.  For example, both the Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Service (JAMS) and the American Arbitration Association (AAA), which 
maintain large rosters of arbitrators for employment disputes, establish qualifications and 
professional standards of impartiality for arbitrators.  These organizations were also 
leading participants, along with representatives of employers, employees, unions, and 
government agencies, in the adoption of the “Due Process Protocol” for statutory 
employment disputes.183  The Due Process Protocol is not law.  Arbitrators themselves 
are the primary enforcers of these standards; they may decline to participate in arbitration 
proceedings that do not meet prevailing standards of fairness, and may implement the 
standards within arbitrations they do conduct.  Arbitrators are effectively engaged in their 
own process of self-regulation through these professional associations, and that process 
has markedly improved the quality of employment arbitration.    
The standards of fairness established by the Protocol and followed by members of 
the AAA address several of the issues of procedural fairness and compliance with 
external law that concern us here.184  Being a product of consensus, the Protocol leaves 
some issues unresolved.  In particular, the Protocol punts on the still-contested question 
of whether pre-dispute arbitration agreements, especially those demanded as a condition 
183
 On the origins of the Due Process Protocol, see Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process 
Protocols, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 369 (2004).
184 The Protocol calls for adequate representation and, where provided by statute, attorneys fees.  It calls 
for the availability of “[a]dequate but limited pre-trial discovery” and information about the arbitrator’s 
recent decisions.  It provides that arbitrators should be knowledgeable about employment law as well as 
about “the employment environment”; “diverse by gender, ethnicity, background, experience, etc.”; 
“independent of bias toward either party” and free from conflicts of interest.  It provides for even-handed 
methods of selecting arbitrators and arbitrator panels.  And it provides that arbitrators “should be bound by 
applicable agreements, statutes, regulations and rules of procedure of the designating agency [e.g., the 
AAA]”; “should be empowered to award whatever relief would be available in court under the law”; and 
should issue written decisions explaining, in particular, “the disposition of any statutory claim(s).”  
Following traditional standards of judicial review for arbitration, the Protocol states that the “arbitrator's 
award should be final and binding and the scope of review should be limited.”  
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of employment, are ever fair.185  It addresses other critical but contentious issues at a high 
level of generality.  For example, it provides for “adequate but limited pre-trial 
discovery,” for awards that describe “the disposition of any statutory claim(s),” and for 
“limited” judicial review of awards, with no real elaboration of what those terms mean.  
Much is left to interpretation and even more to arbitrators’ discretion.186  Still, the Due 
Process Protocol is a major contribution to the fairness of arbitration, due in part to the 
involvement of employee advocates in its formulation.
One other initiative of the AAA bears mention.  The AAA has recently begun to 
publish, in searchable form, employment arbitration decisions issued from 1999 going 
forward.  The prospect of publication may put pressure on arbitrators to explain their 
awards more fully and to demonstrate their evenhandedness and impartiality.   More 
importantly, this move toward transparency will help enable others, including employee 
advocates, to monitor the fairness of arbitrators and of arbitration awards.  That is a 
crucially important development in the evolving system of employment arbitration.  
Organizations such as the AAA and self-regulatory initiatives such as the Due 
Process Protocol are playing a very productive role in upgrading the fairness and the 
transparency of the arbitral process – in both conducting a form of monitoring and in 
enabling monitoring by others.  Unfortunately, there is no legal requirement that 
employment arbitration be conducted by arbitrators who have been certified by a 
reputable organization such as the AAA, or who follow the rules of the AAA or the 
Protocol.187  A straightforward way to improve upon the system of employer self-
regulation of which arbitration is an important part would be to incorporate the self-
regulatory initiatives of arbitrators into the law of employment arbitration.  Courts 
reviewing arbitration agreements and awards should require adherence to the Due 
Process Protocol or its future refinements, as well as the use of an established arbitrator-
185
 Many employee advocates and some arbitrators question the ethical propriety of arbitrating disputes 
that have not been voluntarily submitted to them.  Those who make a living through employment 
arbitration are hard pressed to maintain this position.    
186
 For a balanced critique of this approach to regulation of arbitration in several areas including 
employment, see Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. 
Resol. 369 (2004).
187 Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999)
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provider organization such as the AAA or JAMS that provides reasonable assurance of 
the impartiality and qualifications of arbitrators.  
The EEOC:  It is admittedly tendentious to characterize the EEOC as one of the 
potential monitors rather than one of the public regulators in the system of rights 
enforcement.  By doing so, I mean simply to highlight a few aspects of the EEOC’s role.  
First, it has very limited enforcement powers.  The EEOC has the power to conduct 
investigations of employers, but then private plaintiffs can compel discovery through 
judicial process.  The EEOC “enforces” discrimination law mainly by suing on behalf of 
selected complainants, either at the behest of an individual or on its own initiative.  But 
those functions hardly distinguish the EEOC from a private advocacy organization such 
as the Legal Defense Fund.  Like LDF, the EEOC should presumably be choosing cases 
for their public impact – cases that are otherwise unlikely to be litigated, such as large-
scale hiring cases.  It should, for example, identify large firms that hire relatively few 
minorities or that fail to promote women, and target them for investigation (say, by 
sending “testers,” pairs of black and white “applicants” who present equivalent 
qualifications) and litigation.  But that is what one would expect of a sophisticated legal 
advocacy fund such as LDF.
The EEOC obviously has some distinctive features as a public agency.  It is 
especially significant that the EEOC may sue in court on behalf of individuals who are 
otherwise bound by arbitration agreements.188  The EEOC’s ability to bypass mandatory 
arbitration provides a check against a firm’s ability to completely privatize oversight of 
its performance under the law.  Moreover, the more common mandatory arbitration 
becomes, the more important is the ability of the EEOC to take cases of public or legal 
significance to court, and to maintain the public nature of discrimination law itself by 
preserving the ability of courts to interpret and clarify the law.  Mandatory arbitration is 
likely to become even more common, and the EEOC’s ability to litigate in court in spite 
of a mandatory arbitration agreement even more important, if the courts eventually allow 
the enforcement of arbitration provisions that bar class actions or other aggregation 
188 EEOC. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291-92 (2002).
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mechanisms.189  That result would leave the EEOC standing virtually alone (and 
obviously inadequate) in its ability to pursue some large-scale discrimination cases.  
Whether we conceive the EEOC as a weak regulator or as a strong monitor, it could play 
an important role in a system of enforcement that is otherwise highly decentralized and 
increasingly privatized.      
Among the candidates who do or could serve as “monitors” within a system of 
monitored self-regulation in the enforcement of employee rights, none is ideally suited to 
overcome the public goods, informational, and other barriers to effective individual 
participation in the formation of fair internal and arbitral procedures.  On the other hand, 
each has some performs a useful role by monitoring employers’ personnel practices and 
employment policies, including internal and arbitral procedures for resolving rights 
disputes, beyond what courts can do.  The system of partial self-regulation that is 
evolving within the regime of individual rights could be greatly improved by recognizing 
and formalizing the roles that advocacy organizations, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and 
arbitrators play in the regime.  That would require some guarantee – secured through 
legislative or doctrinal reform – that attorneys can feasibly represent employees in their 
rights claims and in scrutinizing the adequacy of the internal and arbitral processes to 
which those claims are subject; and, second, that arbitrators are affiliated with and subject 
to reputable self-regulating bodies that oversee their professional qualifications and 
conduct, guarantee due process, and maintain the public transparency and accountability 
of arbitral law.
Conclusion
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 recognized both the intrinsic and the 
instrumental value of “industrial democracy” when it sought to secure workers’ ability to 
participate in the workplace decisions that vitally affect them.  But the very term 
“industrial democracy” sounds anachronist, while “workplace democracy” has never 
gained much currency.  That is both cause and symptom of the fact that our elected 
representatives have never seriously revisited the issue since the New Deal.  In the 
meantime, the Wagner Act system has become distorted and dysfunctional if not 
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irrelevant for most employees, while employment law has mushroomed into a fearsome 
hydrahead of liability for employers and a font of rights and entitlements, real or illusory, 
for employees.  
Employment law, both its regulatory and its rights dimensions, is in many ways a 
poor substitute for the system of self-governance envisioned by the labor laws.  Indeed, it 
is not really a substitute at all, for the rights and regulations that make up employment 
law will be inevitably incomplete and underenforced without a complementary system of 
collective representation to back them up.  But the solution to the representation gap may 
lie partly within employment law rather than solely within the traditional realm of “labor 
law.”  For employment law has a broader political constituency, and more points of entry 
for reform efforts, than does labor law.  Employment law also encompasses diverse 
institutional energies and sources of leverage that might be turned to the cause of 
workplace democracy.  Employment law – especially in the form of costly and 
embarrassing litigation – packs a punch.  It can and has led to some dramatic reforms in 
how workplaces are organized, on the part of both employers who have experienced 
litigation and those who have observed its traumatic effect on others.  And employment 
law itself has circled back, as if inevitably, to the realization that “employers” are 
organizations with a vast potential for self-governance and self-regulation.  
The rise of self-regulatory mechanisms for the enforcement of labor standards and 
employee rights presents a kaleidoscope of possibilities.  On the one hand, there are 
undoubtedly vast regulatory resources – knowledge, expertise, and even some good will –
within firms; a regulatory framework that activates and leverages those resources 
promises to be far more effective than one that relies solely on traditional mechanisms of 
adversarial inspections and enforcement.  There will simply never be enough government 
inspectors to do the job alone.  On the other hand, the movement threatens to justify 
regulatory disengagement and to disguise a process of deregulation.  A system of 
privatized enforcement that is detached from public oversight and the prospect of serious 
coercive sanctions for noncompliance may simply obscure the unleashing of market 
forces and of a “race to the bottom” to compete with domestic and foreign low-wage 
competition.  
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The movement toward self-regulation also casts a prismatic light on the 
“representation gap” in the workplace.  On the one hand, it magnifies the dangers of still-
declining levels of unionization.  If responsibility for insuring compliance with rights and 
labor standards is increasingly to be pushed inside the regulated firm itself, then it is 
deeply troubling that the employees whose rights and interests are at stake are 
increasingly unlikely to have an organized voice within the firm.  At the very least, the 
movement toward self-regulation has the makings of a new argument for labor law 
reform that makes unionization possible.  But even if a worker-friendly constellation of 
political forces managed to produce real labor law reform for the first time in a half 
century, it is unlikely to produce anything like widespread collective worker 
representation, at least for decades.  So the problem of the non-union workplace in an era 
of self-regulation must be reckoned with.   
Fortunately the movement toward self-regulation provides not only a justification for 
promoting employee representation but potential leverage in securing new forms of 
employee representation and participation.  If the movement toward self-regulation is, as 
it should be, part of a regulatory scheme in which serious sanctions also play a role, then 
both good corporate citizens and bad actors may be induced to accept conditions –
including some form of employee representation within a scheme of outside monitoring –
either as a prerequisite of responsible self-regulation or as part of a remedy for chronic 
noncompliance.  Unfortunately, full-fledged tripartism is not imaginable within the 
existing landscape of labor relations and politics – the unyielding opposition of American 
employers to unionization and other forms of independent representation of employees, 
and the resulting political deadlock over anything that smacks of “labor law reform.”  
Those stubborn realities have steered my own thinking from a forthright embrace of 
tripartism toward a more pragmatic proposal that seeks footholds for employee 
representation within a system of independently monitored self-regulation.  
 I initially set out to advance not only regulatory efficacy and rights enforcement but 
also democracy in the workplace.  Yet my proposed scheme takes only small and indirect 
steps toward democracy.  It seeks to keep alive the aspiration to tripartism, and to 
independent employee representation, while giving up for the near future on its full-
fledged realization.  
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Rejuvenating the idea of workplace democracy, and of the worker as a citizen of the 
workplace, will contribute to the making of better workplaces and a better democracy.  
But the path to workplace democracy in the US is at best a long one, and its direction is 
uncertain and likely to change in coming decades as transformations in the economy and 
the organization of work continue to race ahead.  The path of democratization does not 
inevitably lead to organizations that would be recognizable as unions.  For pragmatic 
proponents of workplace democracy, the best hope in these circumstances is to take a 
step in the right direction, a step that advances important instrumental goals to which the 
public is more clearly committed while opening a bit of space for workers to decided for 
themselves what forms of self-organization and participation might best serve their
particular needs within the workplace and the labor market.  That is what the model of 
monitored self-regulation represents.  
